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INVISIBLE SETTLEMENTS,
INVISIBLE DISCRIMINATION
MINNA J. KOTKIN*
Now the norm in employment discrimination litigation, secret
settlements resolve actions through private contractual agreements
with confidentiality clauses that prohibit the plaintiff and her
attorney from revealing not only the payment amount but even the
existence of and the facts surrounding the underlying claim. The
court record indicates only that the action was dismissed by
stipulation, for which no judicial approval is required. Successful
outcomes for discrimination victims are shielded from judicial and
public attention, lending credence to claims that discrimination in
the workplace largely has been eradicated. Thus, these invisible
settlements make discrimination in the workplace itself invisible.
Invisibility defeats the intent of the discrimination statutes; skews
empirical studies of discrimination litigation, which inform the
public debate about the prevalence of bias; and hampers lawyers'
ability to counsel and negotiate on behalf of discrimination
claimants. The roots of invisibility can be traced to an increasingly
privatized model of statutory enforcement, which ignores the
deterrence function of public resolutions.
Increased transparency could be achieved by several means. First,
and perhaps most immediately effective, the EEOC could, by
regulation, insist on agency or judicial approval of settlements, just
as it requires a public record of settlements in litigation that it
brings. This policy is followed by the United States Department of
Labor with regard to the worker protection statutes that it
administers. Second, the civil rights bar could take a stand against
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thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, presented at the Brooklyn Law
School faculty workshop, and to acknowledge the support of the law school's Summer
Research Stipend Program. Thanks also to Vivian Berger, Stacy Caplow, Elizabeth
Cooper, Susan Herman, Nan Hunter, and Elizabeth Schneider for their feedback and to
Jason Cade, BLS Class of 2005, and Laureve Blackstone, BLS Class of 2006, for their
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secrecy, as the personal injury bar has done, and gain agreement
from clients in advance to reject settlements that require
confidentiality. Finally, at the very least, the courts could require
submission of the specific terms of stipulated dismissals, without
party identification, so that aggregate data about the nature and
extent of settlements in civil rights litigation could be publicly
available.
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, and her attorneys, agree to keep confidential and not
to disclose to any person or entity (1) the terms, conditions, or
existence of, and amount paid under this Agreement, or any
negotiations relating thereto; (2) the existence of this litigation
and the allegations of employment discrimination raised against
defendant; and (3) the alleged facts underlying those
allegations. Plaintiff will execute a stipulation of dismissal with
prejudice, without reference to this Agreement.1
1. From a confidential settlement agreement on file with the author.
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Invisible settlements make discrimination in the workplace
invisible. Mandated by private contract, they have become the norm
in individual employment discrimination litigation. A substantial
majority of cases filed against private defendants under the various
federal discrimination statutes do not end by pre-trial motions, trials,
or even stipulations of settlement filed with the court and recording
the parties' agreement.2 Instead, the only record of their resolution is
a stipulation of dismissal, which makes no reference to the terms
upon which the action was concluded.' According to the case docket,
it appears that the plaintiff simply gave up. The actual terms of the
settlement are unavailable to the court or the public. They are
reflected only in a settlement contract that contains a confidentiality
clause, such as the one quoted above,4 prohibiting parties from
discussing monetary payments or other relief, or in some cases even
the fact that an action was brought.
Corporate defendants insist on such clauses, fearing that any
public record of settlement will result in a deluge of suits with every
disgruntled employee claiming an entitlement to a cash payment
because of a discriminatory discharge. Employers regularly assert
that no settlement will be reached without confidentiality.
Discrimination lawyers and their clients acquiesce to these conditions
apparently without complaint. To the extent the issue has been
considered at all, the lower courts have signaled that secret
resolutions of discrimination claims are by and large perfectly
acceptable.5 As one federal judge commented, "If a party is doing
something that they do not want the public to know about-and
many parties do-then sign settlement agreements and give the court
2. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004)
(showing increasing rarity of trials); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination
of Trials and Related Matters, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 468 (2004) (noting that
"trials were 19.7% of all civil rights dispositions in 1970 and 3.8% in 2002"); Adam Liptak,
U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at
Al (describing decline in federal civil trials); Judicial Facts and Figures, http://www.
uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/contents.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (providing data
on disposition of all federal civil cases). For the year ending March 31, 2005, only 6.6% of
all civil rights actions actually reached trial in the U.S. district courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT tbl.C-4 (2005).
3. Invisible settlements occur only in individual actions, since class action settlements
must be approved by the court. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (e)(1)(A).
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part III; see also Emily Fiftal, Respecting Litigants' Privacy and Public
Needs, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 518-19 (2003) (noting litigation involving the ability
of parties to keep the terms of a settlement secret).
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a stipulation of discontinuance. All I am signing is a stipulation of
discontinuance pursuant to a private settlement agreement."6
There has been little scholarly attention devoted to invisible
settlements7 in the discrimination realm. Today, settlements and
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") overwhelmingly are viewed
as the preferred means of resolving claims,8 and, as a result, any
means of promoting that end largely are immune from criticism.'
Although secret settlements have been questioned when public health
and safety concerns are at issue, particularly in the context of product
liability claims,0 these concerns are not significantly implicated in the
discrimination context. But invisible settlements demand a closer
look because they have far reaching implications for the future of civil
rights enforcement. As discussed more fully below, the employment
discrimination statutes were neither structured to envision nor
intended to promote secret settlements. The whole thrust of equal
employment legislation was that, by facilitating employee suits,
discrimination would be brought to public attention and the litigation
process would serve to deter other employers from similar conduct.
In addition to their derogation of statutory intent, invisible
settlements hamper lawyers' efforts to evaluate cases, counsel clients,
and negotiate effectively on clients' behalf. Most importantly, this
Article contends invisible settlements do not figure into the judicial or
public perceptions of employment discrimination litigation-
6. See Panel IV: Secrecy and the Courts: The Judge's Perspective, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 169,
193-94 (2000) (including remarks of Judge Denise Cote, Southern District of New York,
distinguishing between such stipulations and settlement agreements "so ordered" by the
court, which are part of the public record).
7. The term was first used by Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud in Don't Try:
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1996). The
authors use the terms in a more general context, however, to refer to the importance of
public trials in contrast to settlements, which do not attract the same level of public
attention. Id. at 4.
8. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process
and Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DiSP. RESOL. 155, 156-59 (2002)
(documenting judicial preference for out-of-court settlement); see also Judith Resnik,
Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of
Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1994)
(describing devices of judges and lawyers for private resolution of conflicts).
9. Reservations have been voiced by a few scholars, of course. See generally Owen
M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (critiquing the settlement process);
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995)
(revisiting Fiss's critiques of settlement).
10. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 477-82 (1991) (evaluating the arguments of those seeking
to restrict protective orders on information related to public health and safety).
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specifically because they are invisible.11  Those perceptions
significantly inform the public policy debate about equal opportunity
in the workplace. In fact, the discourse about employment
discrimination is skewed against workers by virtue of secrecy.
A recent spate of empirical studies demonstrates that although
there has been a substantial growth in employment litigation,
plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail in comparison with other federal
court actions. 12 Commentators have suggested that this is the result
of bias on the part of the factfinders, or alternatively, because the
claims are largely frivolous. 3 These studies succeed in reinforcing
negative judicial perceptions of employment claims. The judiciary
has not been shy in voicing these perceptions for public
consumption, 4 and, in the courtroom, judicial hostility sometimes can
be palpable. 5 Judges do not hesitate to suggest that most plaintiffs
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 429; David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and
Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 535-49 (2003) (examining gender and ethnic differences in
type of employment suit filed and plaintiff success rates); Michael Selmi, Why Are
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557-61 (2001)
(presenting data to show that plaintiffs in employee discrimination suits fare worse than
other civil plaintiffs).
13. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 558 (claiming that bias is "the reason federal
employment discrimination cases are unusually hard to win"); Selmi, supra note 12, at 561
(stating discrimination claims are hard to win because of the courts' biases); id. at 569
(explaining that employment discrimination suits may be difficult to win due to frivolous
claims). For other explanations of low win rates, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (presenting an
economic model of the choice between trial and settlement); Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using
Business Cycle Effects To Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995)
(discussing the effects of business cycles on employment litigation).
14. See, e.g., Kenneth Conboy, Trouble in Foley Square, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1993, at
A17 (editorial by federal district judge, complaining that discrimination cases usurp too
much judicial attention and display "high levels of acrimony and subjective claims of
victimization").
15. A 1997 Second Circuit report details attorneys' perceptions that judges dislike
discrimination claims. One attorney reported that a judge referred to the cases as "skunk
work." Sharon E. Grubin & John M. Walker, Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on
Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 124, 342
(1997). The report also notes that a "Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts"
recommended that cases involving "employment litigation by individuals" should be
diverted to the state courts or administrative agencies. Id.; see also Donna Smith Cude &
Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful Retaliation Under Title VII
Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 14 LAB. LAW. 373,413 (1998)
(quoting a federal judge who expressed his opinion that far too many frivolous
employment discrimination cases have "flooded" the federal courts); Stanley Sporkin,
Reforming the Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU. L. REV. 751, 757 (1992) (claiming that Title VII
2006]
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are whiners and complainers, and not true victims of discrimination. 16
Their hostility is a natural consequence of invisible settlements.
Judges overwhelmingly see the negative outcomes, since the many
favorable outcomes are shielded from judicial imprimatur.
This Article reveals and explains the growth of invisible
settlements in the face of arguably contrary legislative intent and
examines their effect. In Part I, I contend that invisible settlements
are the direct result of Supreme Court decisions concerning civil
rights attorney's fees. By authorizing lump sum settlements, the
Court has undermined the "private attorney general" conception of
civil rights enforcement, 7 privatized discrimination litigation, and
rendered it indistinguishable from tort actions. The Court's
acceptance of ADR methodologies to resolve civil rights claims
furthers the trend toward privatization. 8  Part II addresses the
general debate about secrecy in settlements as it applies to
employment discrimination. I then consider in Part III the degree to
which the courts have invaded secret settlements as a matter of public
policy and the applicability of those cases to invisible discrimination
settlements. In Part IV, I address the impact of invisible settlements
in two respects. First, the failure to recognize and account for
invisible settlements skews the discourse about discrimination
litigation spurred by empirical research. Second, the ubiquity of
invisible settlements impedes plaintiffs' lawyers in evaluating cases,
counseling clients, and effectively negotiating with employers. Part V
offers some means for ameliorating the effect of invisible settlements.
While legislative action requiring court approval of discrimination
settlements or declaring secret settlements void is unlikely, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") could mandate
judicial involvement. In fact, in litigation that it brings in its own
name, the EEOC will not enter into confidential settlements because
they detract from the deterrence function of civil rights
enforcement. 9 An analogous rule requiring judicial approval of
settlements under the Family and Medical Leave Act was adopted by
claims are "overloading" Article III federal courts and that Article I courts should be
established to alleviate the burden); John Edward Davidson, Note, The Temptation of
Performance Appraisal Abuse in Employment Litigation, 81 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1614-17
(1995) (noting the tremendous escalation of federal employment discrimination cases).
16. See Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 559-60 (describing judicial dismissiveness of
judges toward discrimination claims).
17. See infra text accompanying note 29.
18. Recently, the Court approved employment contracts that mandate arbitration of
discrimination claims. See infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
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the Department of Labor, and the rule was upheld by the Fourth
Circuit in July 2005.20 Short of mandating judicial involvement, I
argue that the courts should collect aggregate data when cases are
dismissed by stipulation, thereby providing a more accurate picture of
discrimination litigation outcomes without jeopardizing
confidentiality.
I. THE PRIVATIZATION QF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION
The proliferation of secret settlements is a direct result of the
privatization of employment discrimination litigation. No longer are
such cases viewed as civil rights matters worthy of public attention
and concern. Rather, they have become a species of tort law,21 and
thus, secrecy has become just another bargaining chip easily acceded
to in order to facilitate settlement. In this Part, I trace the
privatization trend to three developments: the adoption of a
contingency fee model for compensating plaintiffs' attorneys; the
heightened involvement of the private bar due to greater availability
of damages; and the increased emphasis on settlement and ADR in
the federal courts.
A. From Fee-Shifting to Contingency Fees
One significant indicator of the public nature of employment
discrimination claims was Congress's decision to depart from the
"American rule" and require employers to pay attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs.22  But a series of Supreme Court decisions
resulted in a shift from fee-shifting to contingency arrangements with
fees paid out of the plaintiff's recovery, which in turn encouraged
private contractual settlements, as this Section explains.
In 1964, in response to the growing civil rights movement,
Congress enacted Title VII to combat discrimination in the
workplace.23 As well-documented by a number of scholars,24 the
20. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 374-75 (4th Cir. 2005).
21. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive le Roi!": An Essay on the
Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After
Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 81-83
(2003) (discussing Title VII as a species of tort law); Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The
After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The
Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175,
193-97 (1993) (discussing the transformation of Title VII claims into tort claims).
22. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 323 (1990).
23. Id.
2006]
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statute's legislative history makes clear that it was intended to
perform a public function that Congress recognized was beyond the
resources of government: to rid the workplace of discrimination.25
That goal was manifest in the creation of a private right of action and
in the decision to depart from the American rule, under which the
parties to an action bear their own attorney's fees regardless of
result.26 In the early twentieth century, the American rule gave rise to
the widespread use of contingent fee arrangements in tort actions,
allowing injured parties to initiate claims without incurring fees.27
Rather than relying on contingencies in employment actions,
Congress took the innovative step of authorizing successful plaintiffs
to recover attorney's fees from employers without reducing their own
recovery?2
The genesis of fee-shifting in this context is the private attorney
general doctrine. In short, the doctrine is an acknowledgment that
when important social policies must be vindicated, it is not sufficient
to rely on litigation brought by the government. Those suffering from
discrimination are in essence deputized to enforce the civil rights
laws.29 Congress recognized the difficulty of attracting qualified
attorneys to this venture. With monetary relief limited to back pay,"
contingency fee representation was not a sufficient financial incentive
24. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the
Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1312-20 (1990) (describing the
legislative process that led to Title VII's reliance on private complainants). See generally
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 983 (1991) (discussing how employment
discrimination litigation has changed since Congress implemented Title VII).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000); S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), as reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910-11. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private
Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183 (discussing how the current Supreme Court
has undercut the private attorney general concept).
26. Brand, supra note 22, at 323.
27. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, ANE REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 253-54 (2004); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature
Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1974-88 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(holding that each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney's fees unless
there is express statutory authorization to the contrary). See generally Brand, supra note
22 (discussing the Supreme Court's impact on fee-shifting legislation).
29. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1967) (per curiam) ("When
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove
difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means
of securing broad compliance with the law.").
30. Before the 1991 amendments to Title VII authorizing compensatory and punitive
damages, monetary relief was limited to back pay. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).
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for the private bar. The potential for fee-shifting offset the likelihood
of small recoveries." Title VII's progeny-the statutes governing age
and disability discrimination-all contain provisions for the award of
attorney's fees to the prevailing party.32
In the forty years since Title VII's passage, its public function has
diminished, largely as a result of the doctrine that grew up around fee
awards in civil rights actions-most significantly the allowance of
lump sum settlement offers. As explained below, a series of Supreme
Court decisions has necessitated the use of contingent fee
arrangements in any employment discrimination action brought by
private counsel.33 As a result, the litigation has been privatized and is
now largely indistinguishable in structure from tort claims.
Contingent fee arrangements create substantial settlement incentives
for plaintiffs' lawyers and to some extent for their clients as well.34
Confidentiality, which creates the absence of public scrutiny, is
viewed as a bargaining chip easily sacrificed for a quicker or bigger
recovery. The model envisioned in 1964 of the civil rights lawyer as
private attorney general is long gone.
Beginning shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the courts struggled to elucidate the purpose and boundaries of
fee-shifting in dozens of decisions.35 Two competing doctrinal strands
are apparent.36 One set of decisions views civil rights cases as an
exceptional breed, so that fee awards need not conform to general
principles of the legal marketplace.37 The other concludes that civil
rights cases are no different from tort claims, and fee awards should
follow that model.38 Early decisions in the "exceptional" camp
31. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
32. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). The Supreme Court has interpreted fee-shifting statutes
consistently. Id. at 603 n.4. See, e.g., Newman, 390 U.S. at 402 (explaining the necessity of
attorney's fees awards in civil rights cases); see also Karlan, supra note 25, at 205-08
(describing the evolution of fee awards in statutory discrimination claims).
33. See generally Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The
Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (1997) (surveying
practitioners regarding the effect of Supreme Court fee decisions on their fee
arrangements).
34. See KRITZER, supra note 27, at 260-65.
35. See Brand, supra note 22, at 316-39 (surveying the Court's fee-shifting cases).
36. The Supreme Court recently had occasion to review many of these early decisions
in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603-05.
37. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (specifically rejecting
notion that civil rights actions for damages are nothing more than a private tort suit).
38. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (stating that the "civil rights claims
were" not to be on "any different footing from other civil claims insofar as settlement is
concerned").
20061
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emphasized the need to attract qualified counsel by generously
interpreting fee award statutes.3 9  Thus, the Court held that a
prevailing plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to fees if he prevails on any
significant issue,4 ° while a prevailing defendant recovers only when
the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." The
Court also approved an advantageous method of calculating awards
that entailed multiplying the number of hours a prevailing plaintiff's
lawyer reasonably expended by the market's hourly rate, regardless
of whether counsel actually billed those rates, or in the case of
representation by a nonprofit group, the client paid no fee at all.42
In Maher v. Gagne,43 the Court first addressed the application of
fee-shifting principles to settlements.4  The case involved a
constitutional challenge to state public assistance regulations.45  A
settlement decree was entered by the district court, which included a
statement that the decree was not intended to constitute an admission
of fault.46 The Second Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that
plaintiffs were prevailing parties within the meaning of the statute.47
On review, the Supreme Court gave short shrift to the argument that
a settling plaintiff could not be considered to have prevailed, noting
that nothing in the statutory fee-shifting provisions requires "a
judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been violated."48
Justice Stevens then quoted with approval the legislative history,
stating that a plaintiff may be a prevailing party "through a consent
judgment or without formally obtaining relief. '49  In Hewitt v.
39. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 580.
40. See Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (per curiam) ("Congress
intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party has prevailed on
the merits of at least some of his claims."); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1967) (recognizing that the award of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs encourages
individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief).
41. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) ("In sum, a
district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title
VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.").
42. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433-34 (1982).
43. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
44. Id. at 124.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 126.
47. Id. at 127.
48. Id. at 129 ("The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than
through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.").
49. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 84
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Helms,"° the Court indicated that this principle is not limited to
injunctive relief: a settlement consisting of the payment of money
before judgment also entitled the plaintiff to prevailing party status.51
Maher confirmed what had already been the accepted practice in
employment discrimination litigation. Settlement was a two-part
process: first, a negotiation on the merits and then, on the fees. If the
merits were resolved, but the fee award could not be agreed upon, the
issues were put before the trial court for decision. As part of the fee
determination, the terms of the settlement would necessarily be
before the court, since the degree of success is one significant factor
in the fee calculation.52 Those terms would necessarily become part
of the public record.
The Court also recognized the exceptional nature of civil rights
fee awards in City of Riverside v. Rivera.3  There, the plaintiff
received a jury award of $33,350 in an excessive force case and then
sought almost $250,000 in attorney's fees.54 The Court held that a fee
award need not be proportionate to the amount of damages
recovered, despite the City's contention that a private tort model
should be applied in damages cases." Spelling out the "exceptional"
doctrinal strand at length, the Court rejected the "notion that a civil
rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort
suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs. '56  It relied on two
principles drawn from the legislative history. First, the Court
established that plaintiffs were securing "important social benefits...
not reflected in nominal or relatively small damages awards," and
that the public has an interest in the vindication of civil rights.5 7
Second, the Court affirmed that full fee recovery was necessary to
attract qualified counsel and "contingent fee arrangements that make
50. 482 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1987) (declining to award attorney's fees where plaintiff
received no damages, no injunction or declaratory judgment, no consent decree, and no
settlement).
51. Id. at 761 ("If the defendant, under the pressure of the lawsuit, pays over a money
claim before the judicial judgment is pronounced, the plaintiff has 'prevailed' in his suit,
because he has obtained the substance of what he sought. Likewise in a declaratory
judgment action: if the defendant, under pressure of the lawsuit, alters his conduct (or
threatened conduct) towards the plaintiff that was the basis for the suit, the plaintiff will
have prevailed."). In Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598, 605-07 (2001), however, the Court
questioned the holdings in Hewitt and Maher, and thereafter, many lower courts have
refused to follow them.
52. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986).
54. Id. at 564-65.
55. Id. at 574.
56. Id.
57. Id.
2006]
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legal services available to many victims of personal injuries would
often not encourage lawyers to accept civil rights cases."58 The Court
also made passing reference to another policy justification: the
damage recovery "contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil
rights violations in the future."59
Reflecting its ambivalence about the interpretation of civil rights
fee-shifting provisions, however, the year before Rivera, the Court
decided Marek v. Chesny,6 a decisive step towards privatizing
employment discrimination litigation and encouraging the invisible
settlement culture. With the dissenting justices in Rivera constituting
the majority, the Court considered whether, in making a Rule 68
offer,61 the defendant could propose a lump sum figure, including
both damages and attorney's fees.6" In approving lump sum
settlements, the Court was motivated exclusively by the value of
promoting settlement.63 It noted that defendants would be reluctant
to make offers if they would still be exposed to an award of attorney's
fees at any amount to be fixed by the district court: "There is no
evidence ... that Congress ... had any thought that civil rights claims
were to be on any different footing from other civil claims insofar as
settlement is concerned."' 4
The Marek Court did not address the ramifications of lump sum
settlements from the perspective of the attorney-client relationship.
At the time of the decision, retainer agreements generally provided
that plaintiff's counsel would seek fees from the court. In Evans v.
Jeff D.,65 decided a year after Marek and contemporaneously with
Rivera, the privatization of the attorney-client relationship was
completed. In Evans, a legal services office brought a class action
against the State of Idaho challenging the adequacy of its educational
programs and health care for disabled children.' Shortly before trial,
58. Id. at 577.
59. Id. at 575 (citing McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 129 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis
omitted)).
60. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
61. Id. at 5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides that if a timely pretrial offer
of a settlement is not accepted "and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not
more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of
the offer." FED. R. CIv. P. 68.
62. The plaintiff's objection to the unbifurcated offer did not stem from any
consideration of civil rights enforcement policy, but rather from the difficulty for plaintiff
to assess the wisdom of accepting the offer. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5.
63. Id. at 6-7.
64. Id. at 10.
65. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
66. Id. at 720.
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the State proposed a settlement which provided all of the injunctive
relief sought but contained a waiver of attorney's fees.67 Because of
what he viewed as his ethical obligation to his clients, plaintiff's
counsel felt compelled to sign the agreement, subject to approval by
the district court, as required by the class action rules.6 The Supreme
Court considered whether a district court must reject a class
settlement because it contains a fee waiver.69 Building directly on
Marek, the Court held that the demand for waiver did not violate the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act. ° The Court also concluded that in
both individual and class actions, the Fees Act does not prohibit
simultaneous negotiation of defendant's liability on the merits and for
attorney's fees.71
In balancing the competing values of settlement efficiency and
promoting representation for civil rights claimants, settlement won
hands down. The Court viewed as remote "the possibility that
decisions by individual clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the
aggregate and in the long run," shrink the pool of lawyers willing to
undertake civil rights claims.7 2 Justice Brennan, writing for the
dissenters, saw the balance differently. He argued that the value of
encouraging litigation to enforce civil rights by attracting counsel
trumps the value of facilitating settlement. 3 He emphasized that fee-
shifting in a civil rights matter is intended to protect the public
interest in widespread enforcement of the laws "over and above the
value of a civil rights remedy to a particular plaintiff."" In short,
67. Id. at 722.
68. Id. at 723 (noting that at oral argument before the district court, the plaintiffs'
attorney "contended that petitioners' offer had exploited his ethical duty to his clients-
that he was 'forced,' by an offer giving his clients 'the best result [they] could have gotten
in this court or any other court,' to waive his attorney's fees" (citation omitted)). The
plaintiffs' attorney argued to the Supreme Court that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
"must be construed to forbid a fee waiver that is the product of 'coercion,' " and that
a "coercive waiver" results when the defendant in a civil rights action (1) offers a
settlement on the merits of equal or greater value than that which plaintiffs could
reasonably expect to achieve at trial but (2) conditions the offer on a waiver of
plaintiffs' statutory eligibility for attorney's fees.
Id. at 729.
69. Id. at 727.
70. Id. at 730-38. The Fees Act allows courts to award prevailing parties in civil rights
actions reasonable attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
71. Evans, 475 U.S. at 738 n.30.
72. Id. at 741 n.34.
73. Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 752.
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Brennan argued that fee awards are not simply another form of relief,
subject to the same kind of negotiation as damages.
Justice Brennan differentiated simultaneous negotiation from fee
waiver, however.7 He envisioned that the demand for waivers would
become the norm76 and would therefore seriously impair the
availability of legal assistance 77 -in direct contravention of
congressional intent, which must take precedence over the judicial
policy favoring settlement.78 Simultaneous negotiation should be
permitted, however, because defendants have a legitimate interest in
knowing the full extent of their liability as long as a reasonable fee is
included in the settlement.79 The dissent also considered certain
ameliorating measures that might address the disincentives created by
the majority holding.80 In particular, Justice Brennan suggested that
civil rights attorneys obtain agreements from their clients barring the
waiver of fees, replicating the private market model in which an
attorney is not required to "contribute his compensation" in order for
the plaintiff to obtain an advantageous settlement.81
The double whammy of Marek and Evans compelled major
changes in employment discrimination representation.82  Since
monetary relief is the primary goal in cases involving individual
plaintiffs, contingency fee arrangements were the only way a lawyer
could ensure that she would receive any fee at all. A defendant could
request a fee waiver in settlement negotiations, but more commonly
the defendant would refuse to bifurcate merits and fees, offering a
lump sum amount.83 Without a prior agreement, an attorney faced
with a lump sum offer would have to enter into a second negotiation
with her client about the amount of her fee. Marek, taken together
with Evans, condoned the decision of a client who demanded that the
settlement be accepted and that he receive the entire amount, thus
75. Id. at 764-65.
76. Id. at 758.
77. Id. at 758-59.
78. Id. at 759.
79. Id. at 762.
80. Id. at 765-66.
81. Id. at 766 n.21.
82. See generally Davies, supra note 33 (discussing whether Supreme Court
interpretation of the fee-shifting provisions makes civil rights attorneys hesitate to
represent some plaintiffs); Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the
Bad Faith Exception of Evans v. Jeff D.: A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553 (1987) (proposing an
interpretation of the bad faith exception that is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the Fees Act, while implementing the Court's goal of encouraging settlement).
83. Davies, supra note 33, at 199.
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resulting in the equivalent of a fee waiver. Therefore, a retainer
agreement specifying a contingent fee arrangement in the case of a
lump sum offer was a lawyer's only protection from having to forego
any payment.
According to Julie Davies, who authored a study of civil rights
attorney behavior in the 1990s, this is exactly what happened. 84
Contrary to Justice Brennan's concern, defendants in employment
discrimination cases did not seek waivers, since plaintiffs' lawyers
quickly adopted retainer agreements either authorizing them to
refuse waiver requests or requiring the client to pay waived fees. But
after Evans, lump sum offers and contingency fee retainers became
the norm.8 5 After conducting extensive interviews with the civil rights
bar in several states, Davies concluded that discrimination claims
were "treated as the equivalent of torts in the settlement process. "86
The norm of contingency fees was further cemented by two
Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980s. In Blanchard v.
Bergeron,87 the Court held that in an application for statutory fees,
the award is not limited to the amount that plaintiff's counsel was
entitled to under a contingent fee agreement.88 Plaintiffs' lawyers also
benefited from the decision in Venegas v. Mitchell,89 which held that
when the amount to which the lawyer is entitled under the
contingency exceeded the statutory award, she is entitled to receive
the excess amount from the plaintiff.9" Thus, lawyers had nothing to
lose and everything to gain by entering into contingent fee
arrangements.
Lump sum offers and simultaneous negotiations were a boon to
defendants, however. Take, for example, the following scenario. An
employee earning $30,000 per year claims discriminatory termination,
and it takes him a year to find an equivalent job. Settlement
discussions begin after the conclusion of discovery. Both sides
perceive their likelihood of prevailing at fifty percent. Attorney's
fees to this point are an additional $30,000. In a bifurcated
negotiation, the plaintiff would presumably settle for $15,000. The
lawyer would then engage in his own negotiation, legitimately arguing
that he was entitled to his full fee, having prevailed through
84. Id. at 248-56 (describing attorney behavior).
85. See id. at 199 (describing the use of a lump sum offer).
86. Id. at 221.
87. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
88. Id. at 93.
89. 495 U.S. 82 (1990).
90. Id. at 86-87.
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settlement.9' Thus, the employer has potential liability of $45,000,
with the total cost of the settlement dependent on how much the
lawyer will discount his fee. With a lump sum simultaneous
negotiation, however, the employer could offer a lump sum of $30,000
and be assured of his total liability. The plaintiff would come away
with $20,000, while the lawyer, under a one-third contingency
arrangement, would receive only $10,000. More importantly, the
defendants would no longer face the risk inherent with bifurcation:
an agreement on the merits, followed by an unsuccessful fee
negotiation. In that case, the fee would be set at the district court's
discretion. Indeed, if the settlement represented a significant portion
of the plaintiff's possible recovery, as in the example above, her
lawyer might successfully argue that since the plaintiff was "the
prevailing party" she-the lawyer-was entitled to compensation for
100% of the time she expended at full market rate.
B. Upping the Ante
Another development contributing to privatization was the
amendment of Title VII in 1991 to permit compensatory and punitive
damages up to a $300,000 cap for larger employers, in addition to
back pay, and to allow for jury trials.' This amendment was part of a
larger legislative package, intended primarily to overrule several
Supreme Court decisions that limited damages in constitutionally-
based race discrimination claims.93 Although the legislative history of
the Title VII amendment is not extensive, the expressed intention was
that additional remedies were necessary to deter discrimination.94
91. Of course, the Buckhannon decision may well vitiate such a claim, since it called
into question whether a private settlement, without judicial involvement, triggers an
entitlement to attorney's fees. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,602, 605-07; Karlan, supra note 25, at 207-08.
92. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
93. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 102-40 (II), at 2-4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 694-96 (explaining that "[t]he Act overrules the Supreme Court's ... decision in
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), which held that ... [42 U.S.C.
§ 1981] does not prohibit racial harassment on the job and other forms of race
discrimination occurring after the formation of a contract;" that "[tlhe Act also overrules
key aspects of the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.
Ct. 2115 (1989)," which held that "victims of discrimination must prove that the
discriminatory practices are not significantly related to a legitimate business objective;"
and that the Act overrules Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), by "provid[ing] that
plaintiffs who reject an offer of settlement more favorable than what is thereafter
recovered at trial will not be barred from recovering attorney's fees incurred for services
performed after the offer is rejected").
94. Id. at 2, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 695.
[Vol. 84
INVISIBLE SETTLEMENTS
The effect of the amendment was profound in several respects.
By increasing potential monetary relief, the negative financial
consequences of contingent agreements became less pronounced. If,
with the hypothetical plaintiff discussed above, the employer faced
possible additional damages liability equal to twice the amount of
back pay ($60,000) and he discounted that amount by the likelihood
of success, the settlement would be increased by $30,000, for a total of
$60,000 (fifty percent of the total of $30,000 in back pay, $60,000 in
damages, and $30,000 in fees). The plaintiff's attorney then would
receive a contingency fee of $20,000. Moreover, the availability of a
jury trial made the threat of much greater damages a substantial
bargaining chip for the plaintiff.
The amendment also affected the visibility and perception of
discrimination claims in several ways. First, this new calculus
attracted a different segment of the bar. Employment discrimination
no longer was the exclusive province of the public interest and civil
rights bar whose interest in litigation stemmed at least as much from
its public and political function as from its remunerative benefits.95
As one litigator put it, commenting on the 1991 amendments, "Not
only has the legal landscape changed, so have the players. Many trial
lawyers, who once focused their practice on more traditional personal
injury cases, now find a new field to plow in employment
discrimination cases. '96  Litigating a client's entitlement to
compensatory and punitive damages was "familiar territory" for
personal injury lawyers, as was the presumption of contingent fee
agreements. 97
Second, and more frequently discussed, the number of cases filed
greatly increased. One recent statistical study shows a total of 102,847
employment discrimination actions filed between 1979 and 1991,
compared to 162,509 between 1992 and 2000.91 In 1991, 8,303 cases
were concluded, compared to 22,359 in 2000 99-- this is a 270%
increase. 1° Although the passage of the Americans with Disabilities
95. See Christine Jolls, The Role and Functioning of Public-Interest Legal
Organizations in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws 25 (Harvard Law and Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 498, 2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/olinscenter/papers/pdf/Jolls_498.pdf.
96. Lewis R. Hagood, Claims of Mental and Emotional Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 577, 578 (1999).
97. Id.
98. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 457.
99. Id. at 433.
100. Id.
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Act in 1990 accounts for some of the increase,"0 ' those cases make up
only ten percent of the employment discrimination docket."°2
Whether because more employees saw litigation as financially
advantageous, or more lawyers were available to represent them, the
generally-accepted explanation for the increase is the passage of the
1991 Act.103
C. The Push To Settle
One other factor contributed significantly to civil rights
privatization. The increase in employment discrimination litigation
during the 1990s coincided with what has been termed a "paradigm
shift" towards alternative dispute resolution in the federal courts."
That effort began modestly in 1983 with an amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16, requiring judges to address at pre-trial
conferences the possibility of using ADR."5 The 1990 Civil Justice
Reform Act went further: it authorized the implementation of pilot
projects setting up court-annexed ADR programs.0 6  These
experimental efforts led to the passage of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act, which mandates that each district court establish an
ADR program and authorizes judges to require parties to participate
in non-binding mediation." 7 Many district courts use the growing
101. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)).
102. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 434.
103. See, e.g., Gregory Todd Jones, Note, Testing for Structural Change in Legal
Doctrine: An Empirical Look at the Plaintiffs Decision to Litigate Employment Disputes a
Decade after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997, 1028 (2002)
(concluding from a study of outcome data from federal employment discrimination cases
filed between 1970 and 1995 that "the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did, in fact, engender a
significant structural change in legal doctrine that has had a dramatic effect on the
plaintiff's decision to escalate an employment dispute to litigation").
104. See Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1851, 1860 (2000).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1861; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000).
107. Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, supra note 104, at 1861.
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York is an example of a
court with a voluntary court-annexed ADR program. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER ET AL.,
ADR & SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICr COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR
JUDGES & LAWYERS 201-03 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. & CPR Inst. for Disp. Resol. 1996),
available at www.fjc.gov (follow "Publications" hyperlink). Under its rules, most civil
cases qualify for court-annexed ADR. Parties are notified that they may consent to
arbitration, in addition to the mandatory settlement conferences held by magistrate
judges. The Western District of New York was one of ten pilot voluntary court-annexed
ADR programs. The court maintains a roster of approved arbitrators or parties can select
their own. When parties choose to consent to arbitration, the arbitrators are paid by the
court. Once referred to arbitration, the case proceeds in its usual way with the assigned
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number of magistrate judges to preside over settlement negotiations
or to engage in formal mediation with the parties." 8 The Judicial
Conference has encouraged this approach to settlement.10 9
The push towards ADR and the use of magistrate judges rather
than Article III judges to encourage and supervise settlement
negotiations has added to the privatization of employment
discrimination litigation. Lump sum settlement offers have virtually
eliminated the litigation of motions for attorney's fees, thereby
shielding settlement figures from the view of the judiciary and the
public. Mandated mediation and the delegation of settlement
supervision to magistrate judges has added to that trend. Legal
scholars have been left to debate the consequences of the trend
towards private and secret resolutions.
II. THE CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT DEBATE
It is generally perceived that secret settlements are quite
common and their numbers growing."0 Empirical support for this
proposition is meager, however. Not surprisingly, no researcher has
undertaken the task of reviewing the seventy percent of civil cases
that terminate neither by motion nor trial but by stipulated dismissal
to determine how many contain the actual terms of, or at least some
reference to, settlement.111 Moreover, such a study in some respects
would be fruitless, since it would reveal only one of two types of
secret settlements. In the first type, the court record would indicate
that the action is dismissed pursuant to a private settlement contract,
or that it was resolved by a private settlement contract known as a
stipulation of settlement under seal."2 The second and perhaps more
judge until the order designating the arbitrators is filed. Arbitration hearings occur within
thirty days of being requested and are usually concluded in one day. The arbitrator has
ten days to file the award and parties have thirty days to request a trial de novo. Id.
108. Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 661,673 (2005).
109. See Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for
Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REV. 712, 716-17 (1994).
110. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing
the "increasing frequency and scope of confidentiality agreements that are ordered by the
court"); City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Disturbingly, some
courts routinely sign orders which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the
propriety of such orders .... ).
111. See Selmi, supra note 12, at 558-60.
112. A recent study examined the prevalence of sealed settlements. See ROBERT
TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURT 1 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2004), available at www.fjc.gov (follow "Publications"
hyperlink). The Federal Judicial Center looked at 288,846 civil cases in a mostly random
sample of fifty-two districts. Id. at 3. One in 227 cases had sealed settlement agreements,
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common type of secret settlement is truly invisible and defies any
attempt at calculation, because all that the court record indicates is a
stipulation of discontinuance or dismissal. While a likely explanation
is that these cases have been settled with some remuneration to the
plaintiff, there are certainly other possibilities: the plaintiff decides
not to pursue the matter or decides to file it in a different court, for
example.
The debate over the propriety of secret settlements has focused
on products liability and mass tort litigation, with little attention given
to the impact of secret settlements on civil rights laws."3 In this Part,
I review the arguments, pro and con, articulated in the torts context,
and then consider how the arguments relate specifically to
employment discrimination litigation. Here again, a chronological
narrative is helpful to an understanding of the debate.
In the late 1980s, several investigative reports in the media
revealed that secret settlements were concealing information about
hazardous products and environmental dangers."' The resultant
public outcry led a number of state legislatures to enact "Sunshine in
Litigation" statutes, which generally required judges to consider
public health and safety concerns before sealing court records.115 The
Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA") took the
position that lawyers and the courts should resist secrecy agreements,
citing the danger to the public."6
The academic debate followed soon thereafter, with the sides
sharply drawn. Led by Arthur Miller, the proponents of
or 1,270 total cases. Id. The study found that sealed settlement agreements are filed in
less than 0.5% of civil cases. Id. In 97% of these cases, the complaint is not sealed. Id. at
6. Twenty-seven percent of the cases with sealed settlement agreements are employment
cases. Id. at 5. Another 10% are other civil rights cases. Id.
113. See generally Miller, supra note 10 (responding to discovery reform proposals in
the context of cases involving public health and safety); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case
Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUD.
LEGAL ETHICS 115, 118 (1999) (criticizing secret settlements in cases involving public
health and safety).
114. See Barry Meier, Deadly Secrets: System Thwarts Sharing Data on Unsafe
Products, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 24, 1988, at 21; Barry Meier, Legal Merry-Go-Round:
Case Highlights Lack of Data Sharing, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 5, 1988, at 24; Elsa Walsh
& Ben Weiser, Public Courts, Private Justice (pts. 1-4), WASH. POST, Oct. 23-26, 1998, at
Al.
115. See, e.g., 1990 Fla. Laws 20 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2004));
TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 76a (Vernon 2003).
116. See Philip H. Corboy, Secret Settlements: The Challenges Remain, TRIAL, June
1993, at 122, 122. Of course, secret settlements also had the effect of inhibiting lawyers
from publicizing their successes to attract new clients.
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confidentiality raised a series of concerns." 7 The first argument is
wholly instrumental. The proponents widely claim that without
confidentiality, defendants would simply refuse to settle cases. 8 And
settlement, of course, is viewed as a positive good, without which
litigants would be forced to expend unnecessary funds, and the
overloaded courts would cease to function." 9 Second, proponents of
confidentiality argue that both parties are protected from vexatious
claims: plaintiffs are not harassed by long-lost relatives, and
defendants are shielded from claimants with meritless actions,
looking for a deep pocket. 2' Third, they assert that parties to
litigation should not have to give up all rights of privacy12 and should
be able to maintain their freedom to enter into contracts. 122 Fourth,
they contend that plaintiffs' lawyers have an ethical duty to maximize
their clients' recovery and, therefore, are bound to use secrecy as a
bargaining chip.
123
None of these claims addresses the backbone of the argument
against confidentiality: the right of the public to know. The Miller
camp acknowledges that in rare instances, some public access to
information may be appropriate, but there is never reason to make
public the amount of a settlement: "It is difficult to imagine why the
general public would have anything more than idle curiosity in the
dollar value of a settlement .... "124
The public access camp responds to each of the proponents'
arguments. First, there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that
settlement rates decrease without guaranteed confidentiality or that
public settlements encourage frivolous claims. 25 No studies have
been done in those states with sunshine legislation, although ATLA
117. See generally Miller, supra note 10 (arguing against public access to litigation
information reforms).
118. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement
Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 959, 1009 (1988) (discussing the importance of
confidentiality agreements as a negotiating tool).
119. Miller, supra note 10, at 486-87.
120. Id. at 485.
121. Id. at 464-67.
122. David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions
Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1220; Miller, supra
note 10, at 467-74.
123. Miller, supra note 10, at 489-90.
124. Id. at 484-86.
125. See, e.g., Dana & Koniak, supra note 122, at 1225 (noting that "there is no
evidence that these differences among jurisdictions have translated into differences in
settlement timing and/or settlement rates"); Zitrin, supra note 113, at 118 (noting that
even where states have enacted restrictions on secret settlements, there was "no indication
of a resulting court logjam, or even that settlement rates have gone down").
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asserts that the volume of litigation has decreased since Florida
enacted its version of the law.'26 Moreover, contractual terms that
violate public policy are never enforceable.'27 Similarly, while lawyers
owe an ethical duty to maximize client recovery, they may not up the
settlement figure by allowing clients to enter into agreements that
would require the client to commit illegal acts, for example.'28
Public access advocates contend secret settlements are
affirmatively dangerous in two respects. First, they sometimes
endanger public health and safety. 129  To use just one example, the
danger of some breast implants was kept from the public through
secret settlements for years, while women continued to undergo this
procedure. 30 Second, they reduce the deterrent effect of litigation,
which, along with compensation, is the goal of the tort system. 3'
Nevertheless, most public access advocates recognize that, under
current rules of ethics, for a lawyer to reject an advantageous
settlement that the client wishes to accept because the defendant
insists on secrecy would constitute an ethical violation. 132 Professional
responsibility scholars have proposed Rule amendments as a remedial
measure. 33 Such an amendment recently was rejected by the ABA,
however, on the grounds that the issue was more appropriate for a
legislative solution."M
126. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 122, at 1225 n.18. "The authors further note that
the complete absence of any reports of studies suggesting a decrease in settlement rates
following the enactment of restrictions on secret settlements is notable given the
substantial resources of those interest groups that favor secret settlements, and their
ability to fund research." Id.
127. Id. at 1221.
128. Id. at 1220.
129. See generally Zitrin, supra note 113, at 119-21 (discussing several cases where
secret settlement agreements kept information about dangerous products from the
public).
130. See Laleh Ispahani, Note, The Soul of Discretion: The Use and Abuse of
Confidential Settlements, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 111, 119-21 (1992).
131. Zitrin, supra note 113, at 118.
132. Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave, Current Development, A Plaintiffs
Lawyer's Dilemma, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 820-26 (2003) (finding no option for
an attorney who opposes a confidential settlement, except perhaps to withdraw).
133. See, e.g., Dana & Koniak, supra note 122, at 1217 n.1 (reporting that the ABA
Ethics 2000 Commission rejected a proposed rule change on secret agreements); Zitrin,
supra note 113, at 115-17 (proposing amendment of ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct); Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be
Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883, 904-06 (2004) (discussing Zitrin's proposed rule change
for South Carolina); Kevin Livingston, Open Secrets, RECORDER, May 8, 2001, at 1
(discussing Zitrin's proposal to the ABA 2000 Ethics Commission).
134. Dana & Koniak, supra note 122, at 1217 n.1 (reporting grounds for rejection
included belief that state legislative action would be more appropriate); Richard A. Zitrin,
The Judicial Function, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1565, 1594 (2004) (detailing proposed
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Both sides of the debate acknowledge that there is an obvious
and relatively simple fix to the public health and safety concerns. The
trial courts should exercise their inherent authority to determine
whether documents and settlements should be sealed.135 The pro- and
anti-secrecy camps differ, however, on the standard of scrutiny:
should settlements be presumptively confidential or presumptively
public? In any case, such judicial oversight is available only when the
parties seek court involvement in the settlement by requesting
confidentiality, and case law indicates judges will generally favor
secrecy in order to control their docket.136 The debate over judicial
scrutiny is meaningless in the context of invisible settlements,
however, where the court is not even made aware of the fact of
settlement, let alone the terms, and there is no request to seal
anything.
David Luban has provided the most nuanced consideration of
secret settlements. 37  He begins by returning to Owen Fiss's
proposition that settlement itself is problematic because it does not
result in the articulation of public values in the way that adjudication
does. 38 Luban argues that settlements can, in many respects, serve
the same function, but not if they are secret.139 He views the debate
as between those who consider adjudication as a private problem-
solving mechanism and those who consider it to be a means of
articulating public values and an integral element of the political
process. 140  Luban also acknowledges the problem of invisible
settlements. He proposes that courts should refuse to enforce secrecy
contracts as contrary to public policy. 141
As with reliance on judicial scrutiny, this solution is hardly
realistic for an individual employment discrimination litigant. The
plaintiff employee would have to breach the confidential settlement
agreement by disclosing, and the defendant employer would have to
institute a breach of contract action. The former plaintiff, who must
employ counsel to defend the action would, of course, take a risk that
amendment); Waldbeser & DeGrave, supra note 132, at 823-24 (2003) (noting the ABA's
rejection of the proposed amendment); Livingston, supra note 133 (reporting that the
ABA rejected Zitrin's proposed amendment).
135. Cf. Miller, supra note 10, at 501 (stating that it is appropriate to let judges decide
when to maintain confidentiality).
136. Dana & Koniak, supra note 122, at 1235.
137. See Luban, supra note 9, at 2648-58.
138. Id. at 2626-40; see also Fiss, supra note 9, at 1075 (stating that settlement should
not be encouraged).
139. Luban, supra note 9, at 2648-50.
140. Id. at 2632-35.
141. Id. at 2648-58, 2661-62.
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the court would uphold the contract, and he would have to pay
damages for the breach. There would have to be substantial
accumulation of precedent for such a course of action to be at all
advisable. The next Part will look at the present state of the case law.
III. THE COURTS' APPROACH TO SECRET SETTLEMENTS
Although academic attention devoted to secret settlements has
focused on torts rather than civil rights, the courts have
acknowledged the public policy concerns at issue in the employment
context as well.142 These decisions provide little ammunition for
resisting secret settlements, however, because they address narrow
factual situations, usually involving third party attempts to gain access
to the contractual agreement. In one recent Second Circuit decision,
however, the concerns raised by secret settlements were squarely
addressed. 43
A. Invasion by Third Parties
Judicial opinions on secret settlements arise in several different
circumstances: a request to seal a settlement, or more commonly, for
a protective order to seal discovery or motion papers; a new action by
a third party to invade a confidentiality agreement; or a breach of
contract action against a party who has revealed secret terms. Not
surprisingly, few reported decisions address the last situation.144
Likewise, a request to seal a settlement is generally not opposed, and
therefore is not reflected in reported decisions, since it is a condition
of the settlement. Parties will seek to file a settlement only when they
wish the matter to remain under the court's jurisdiction for
142. Cf. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the need
for a presumption in favor of public access to judicial documents, especially those related
to the disposition of a suit); Calvert v. Mehlville R-IX Sch. Dist., 44 S.W.3d 455 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that defendant school board could disclose the existence of a
confidential settlement agreement pursuant to local open meeting laws).
143. See Gambale, 377 F.3d at 140.
144. In fact, reported cases seem to exclusively concern the enforcement of
confidentiality agreements by former plaintiffs. See, e.g., Calvert, 44 S.W.3d at 455-56
(terminated employee sues former employer for disclosing fact of settlement agreement
under state open meetings law); Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1082-84 (Utah Ct.
App. 2000) (terminated employee sues employer for making statements to press about
sexual harassment suit). But see Camp v. Eichelkraut, 539 S.E.2d 588, 590-92 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001) (employer sues employee for speaking to police and insurance fraud
investigators). See generally Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan,
Buying Silence, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 151 (1998) (exploring the competing considerations
undertaken by courts in determining when to enforce confidentiality agreements against
former employees).
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enforcement purposes. 145 With regard to the sealing of other filed
papers, courts generally will abide by a stipulation of the parties. If
confidentiality is contested, the courts will use a "good cause"
standard and are generous in protecting information claimed to be
trade secrets, or more commonly in employment cases, personnel files
of third parties."
Thus, most reported decisions relating to secret settlements
concern third party attempts to obtain settlement information or to
release a party from a gag order.47 In several cases, the EEOC has
sought such relief. EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc.,'" is illustrative of the
courts' approach. The district court had granted the EEOC's request
for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of pre-complaint
confidential settlement agreements that the employer entered into
with a number of employees who had potential sexual harassment
claims.149  These agreements included provisions barring the
employees from discussing the settlement terms.150  During an
investigation of class-wide sexual harassment, the EEOC determined
that employees felt bound not to talk to its investigators and sought
an injunction restraining the employer from enforcing the
agreements.' The First Circuit characterized the issue as balancing
the public interest in private dispute settlement and the public
interest in EEOC enforcement. 52 It ruled that the balance tipped in
favor of the EEOC's mission to investigate and enforce the anti-
discrimination laws.153  Although the Astra court invoked public
policy, it made clear that it did not intend to impinge upon secret
settlements as such, but only to the extent that they interfered with
the EEOC's mission.54  Moreover, even in this situation, it
specifically endorsed maintaining the confidentiality of the settlement
145. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994); see also
REAGAN ET AL., supra note 112, at 5 ("Sealed Settlement agreements appear to be filed
typically to facilitate their enforcement.").
146. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5.34 (3d ed.
2005).
147. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 226 (1998) (regarding
plaintiffs who sought to release a former GM employee from a confidentiality agreement
so the employee could testify in the plaintiffs' product liability action against GM).
148. 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996).
149. Id. at 741-42.
150. Id. at 741.
151. Id. at 741-42.
152. Id. at 744 ("[Wle must weigh the impact of settlement provisions that effectively
bar cooperation with the EEOC on the enforcement of Title VII against the impact that
outlawing such provisions would have on private dispute resolution.").
153. Id. at 744-45.
154. Id. at 744-45.
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amount. Astra therefore does little to deter secret settlements in the
general run of employment discrimination cases.
In Kalinauskas v. Wong,'55 the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada took a slightly broader approach. There, an
employee suing for sex discrimination sought to depose a former
employee who had settled a similar action pursuant to a sealed
settlement agreement with a confidentiality clause.156 The court
permitted the deposition, again finding that the balance of interests
favored the discovery of highly relevant information over the
promotion of efficient dispute resolution through confidential
settlements.57 Nevertheless, the court also protected the disclosure of
the substantive terms, including the amount of the settlement.158
Another case that comes closer to-but ultimately skirts-the
real issue is EEOC v. Rush Prudential Health Plans.'59 In this case, an
employee filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that her employer
had discriminated against her on the basis of age and disability."6
When its attempts to negotiate with the employer failed, the EEOC
brought a disability discrimination action.1 61 The employee, now
represented by private counsel, intervened in the EEOC's action.'62
While the EEOC and the employer engaged in settlement
negotiations, the employee agreed to a confidential settlement and
her action was dismissed.'63 The EEOC sought disclosure of the
amount of recovery, arguing that disclosure was relevant "to its
determination of whether the public interest requires [it] to proceed
further with the lawsuit" or to enter into a consent decree.' 64 As the
court noted, whether the settlement was nominal or substantial would
have an impact on the public interest in further litigation. 65 The
court ordered disclosure, subject to a protective order barring the
EEOC from revealing the settlement amount.166 Significantly, the
court rejected the EEOC's arguments of more general applicability:
that public awareness of settlement figures is necessary to deter other
155. 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993), affd, No. 95-16645, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2766
(9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1997) (mer.).
156. Id. at 365.
157. Id. at 365-66.
158. Id. at 367.
159. No. 97 C 3823, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4170 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1998) (mer.).
160. Id. at *2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *5.
165. Id. at *6.
166. Id. at *14.
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employers from discrimination 67 and to make settlement payments
more than just a cost of doing business.168
Again in the third party intervenor context, the Third Circuit
considered the added complication of invisible, rather than sealed,
settlements: what happens when the settlement agreement is the
subject of a confidentiality order but is not filed with the court? In
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,'169 a local newspaper sought to
intervene to obtain the settlement agreement, subject to a
confidentiality order, in a § 1983 action in which a police chief
challenged his termination. 7 ' Had the settlement been filed, it would
have been accessible under a state sunshine law, but the court held
that an unfiled agreement, even when it had been reviewed by the
trial court, was not a "judicial record" subject to the statute.17' The
newspaper therefore sought also to vacate the confidentiality order.'72
The court held that confidentiality orders relating to settlement
agreements must be reviewed under the "good cause" standard, using
the typical balancing test. In vacating the order, the court gave
great weight to the fact that the action involved a public entity and
"matters of legitimate public concern."' 74 The court also emphasized
that "where it is likely that information is accessible under a relevant
freedom of information law, a strong presumption exists against ...
an order of confidentiality."'75 However, the court also pointed to the
obvious means of sidestepping its decision: if good cause cannot be
shown, the parties "have the option of agreeing privately" to
confidentiality and enforcing the agreement through a contract
action, a result that "may in fact be preferable to the current trend of
increasing judicial secrecy." '176
A recent New Jersey case, Llerena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co.,77
comes close to confronting the broader policy objections to secret
settlements. An employee suing on a sexual harassment claim
167. Id. at *9.
168. Id. at *9-10.
169. 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).
170. Id. at 775-76.
171. Id. at 781; see also id. at 782 ("Simply because a court has entered a confidentiality
order over documents does not automatically convert those documents into 'judicial
records' accessible under the right of access doctrine.").
172. Id. at 783-84.
173. ld. at 786-88 (establishing good cause by showing that disclosure will work a
clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure).
174. Id. at 788.
175. Id. at 791.
176. Id. at 788-89.
177. 845 A.2d 732 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002).
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learned of a similar action against the employer that had been settled,
but he was precluded from learning more due to a confidential
settlement agreement. 7 8 Finding that the terms of the settlement
would be probative with regard to the employer's knowledge and
action concerning other instances of harassment, 17 9 the court weighed
the balance in favor of access. 80 Unlike the decisions discussed
above, the court explicitly considered the need to vindicate the public
interest in non-discriminatory employment practices as favoring the
invasion of confidentiality.' Nevertheless, as in Rush Prudential
Health Plans, the plaintiff was prohibited from further dissemination
of the settlement terms.182
Cases such as these acknowledge the public policy in favor of
openness only in its most narrow formulation: discovery may be
permitted in aid of enforcement efforts, particularly when the
government is involved, but public access as a means of deterrence is
trumped by dispute resolution values. This is the same calculus that
drives the Supreme Court's decisions relating to attorney's fees and is
further confirmed by the Court's decisions approving compelled
arbitration of discrimination claims. 83  The policies enunciated in
these cases leave little room for a generalized attack on secret
settlements.
B. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG: One Court Takes a Stand
The more generally applicable policy implications of secret
settlements finally attracted direct judicial attention in a highly
unusual factual situation considered by the Second Circuit. One
district judge clearly was concerned with whether secret settlements
are contrary to the intent of the civil rights law and took matters into
his own hands." He encouraged defense counsel to reveal the
amount of a confidential settlement and then issued an opinion that
disclosed the amount in general terms, apparently with the belief that
178. Id. at 734-35.
179. Id. at 736.
180. Id. at 739.
181. Id.
182. Id. The court also noted that "the confidential agreement does not provide for
absolute secrecy," in particular allowing for disclosure if "required ... by subpoena or
court order." Id. at 738-39.
183. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (enforcing
compelled arbitration for a state-law employment discrimination claim); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (enforcing compelled arbitration in
an age discrimination claim).
184. See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 02 Civ. 4791 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11180, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003).
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the public had a right to know about discrimination by a major
bank.'85 In Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG,86 the Second Circuit did
not take kindly to this tactic, but with "the cat out of the bag," it
could only admonish the lower court with the direction that
confidential agreements must be respected.87
In Gambale, a bank executive brought a sex discrimination
claim. 88 Following common practice, the parties stipulated to the
confidentiality of certain discovery documents relating to salaries of
other employees and to gender diversity statistics.'89 When the
plaintiff filed these documents as exhibits to her motion opposing
summary judgment, a magistrate judge issued a temporary protective
order sealing the documents until their confidentiality could be
considered by the trial judge.19 Ten days after the bank's motion for
summary judgment was in large part denied, the parties advised the
district judge that they had reached a settlement. 191 The district judge
ordered that the parties appear at a conference "to present a
stipulation of discontinuance pursuant to the settlement
agreement."'19
On the day of the conference, the parties executed the settlement
agreement, which contained a confidentiality clause governing the
entire contract including the amount of payment, and a clause
agreeing that the documents would remain under seal.' 93 At the
conference, the parties requested that the court retain jurisdiction to
hear any future disputes about payment.1 94 In response to the court's
inquiry, defense counsel revealed the amount of the settlement, with
the understanding that it would remain confidential.195 The judge
then "wondered aloud why the public should not know about
discrimination at a major banking institution.' 196 Despite defense
counsel's argument that the agreement contained "no admission of
liability" and that disclosure would deter settlement, the court
requested briefing of the issue but sealed the conference transcript. 97
185. Id. at *5-7, 9.
186. 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
187. Id. at 136-37.
188. Id. at 134-35.
189. Id. at 135.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 136.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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At a second conference, the court notified the parties that it would
disclose the settlement terms "unless the Bank agreed to conduct a
global gender review," to be evaluated by the judge to determine
whether further action was necessary to combat discrimination. 198
After the bank rejected these conditions, "the parties filed a
stipulation of dismissal," and the bank then asserted that "the court
no longer had jurisdiction" to disclose the settlement terms or unseal
documents. 199 The court invited the bank to move to have the sealing
order made permanent.2 0 Without addressing the merits, the bank
argued only that the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the
motion.20'
The court then issued an opinion unsealing the documents. 20 2 It
ruled that because the documents had been relied upon in the
summary judgment ruling, they were "judicial documents," and
therefore entitled to the presumption of public access.20 3 The opinion
also made reference to "a multi-million dollar settlement," which
became immediately available to the public through online
databases.2°
Upon application by the bank, the Second Circuit stayed the
release of the documents pending appeal, but denied the bank's
motion to seal the district court's opinion, as it was by then already
publicly available. 20 Because plaintiff's counsel took no position on
access to the documents, the court appointed a private firm as amicus
curiae counsel to argue for public disclosure.2 6 With regard to the
unsealing order, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court,
holding that the stipulation did not divest the court of the power to
determine whether documents should remain sealed, and that the
court had not abused its discretion in ordering their unsealing. 2°7 It
relied on the presumption in favor of public access to documents that
directly affect adjudication and the court's inherent supervisory
powers over its own records.208
198. Id. at 136-37.
199. Id. at 137.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 137-38.
204. Id. at 137.
205. Id. at 138.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 142.
208. Id. The bank did not argue in the district court that there was good cause for the
protective order, relying instead entirely on its jurisdictional argument. Id.
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Judicial disclosure of the amount of the settlement, however,
"[stood] on starkly different footing," according to the appeals
court.2 °9 With little discussion, the court first determined that there
was no presumption of access to an unfiled agreement that does not
form a basis for adjudication.210 It noted also that if confidentiality
facilitates settlement, the courts should honor the parties'
agreement.11 Second, with regard to the transcript of the conference,
during which the district judge "insisted on learning the settlement
amount," only a weak presumption of access is applicable.212
Although the transcript is a judicial record, the revelation of the
settlement amount was couched in terms of confidentiality and did
not relate to the adjudication of the matter.213 Without a "showing of
public interest in the disclosure," the bank's articulated reasons for
confidentiality-the agreement was a private contract and did not
contain any admission of wrongdoing or promise to change its
policies-were sufficient to overcome the "weak presumption of
access," and the court ordered that the transcript remain under seal.2 14
Finally, the court considered the language of the lower court's
unsealing order, and found that its reference to the magnitude of the
payment "was a serious abuse of discretion. '215 Since "the genie [was]
out of the bottle," however, the court had no power to remedy the
breach of confidentiality.216
Although the Second Circuit made passing reference to the
"public interest, '217 it did not address the issue raised by the lower
court: why shouldn't the public know about discrimination by a
major bank?28 Because the bank's counsel saw the direction in which
the district court was headed, it changed its procedural strategy and
effectively removed this policy question from the court's purview.2 9
Originally, the defendant had requested that the court retain
jurisdiction and "appoint a special master to hear future [payment]
disputes. '22  This request would have entailed the filing of the
stipulation, presumably under seal to maintain confidentiality. Once
209. Id. at 143.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 143-44.
215. Id. at 144.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 143-44.
218. Id. at 136.
219. Id. at 137.
220. Id. at 136.
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the court made clear that it. would not seal the settlement without a
consideration of public access, the bank withdrew its request for
continuing jurisdiction, and by filing a stipulation of dismissal, hoped
to divest the court of its power to consider whether confidentiality
was appropriate. 2
The Second Circuit rejected the jurisdictional argument as to the
sealed discovery documents and considered the merits of disclosure,
but it did not do so for the unfiled settlement agreement. It was
satisfied with the representation that confidentiality was "the parties'
express wish," which must be honored to encourage settlement.22
The court seemed to suggest, however, that settlement agreements
may not be completely immune from judicial scrutiny: "We cannot
and do not conclude that there can never be a circumstance or a
showing that would require such disclosure. '223  Although this
language in Gambale may be viewed as opening the door to further
review of secret settlements, the "circumstance" or "showing" to
which the court alludes is hard to envision.2
In the typical employment discrimination case, defense counsel
does not seek a special master or ask the court to retain jurisdiction
and therefore has no need to request a settlement agreement to be
filed under seal. Certainly, after Gambale, no defense counsel who
wants to maintain confidentiality would do so, since the decision
suggests that even with a confidentiality clause, there may be a
presumption of public access to any filed document. Nor will defense
counsel discuss the terms of a signed, confidential agreement even at
the urging of the court. In essence, Gambale actually legitimizes and
serves to cement the mechanisms that keep settlements secret. In
addition, Gambale highlights the fact that no one represents the
public interest in these situations. The circuit court had to appoint
amicus curiae counsel to argue in favor of disclosure, and it does not
appear that counsel actually advocated for the release of the
settlement amount. 25
Could Gambale have been decided differently? The court
recognized that secrecy in judicial proceedings is highly disfavored,
and a court must balance the right of public access against the need
for confidentiality.226 The argument can be made that this principle is
221, Id. at 136-37.
222. Id. at 143.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225, Id. at 138.
226. Id. at 143.
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equally applicable to settlements. Relying on the purpose and intent
of the discrimination statutes, the Second Circuit could have found
that the district court was entitled to inquire whether a need for
confidentiality existed other than because the parties had agreed to it
to facilitate settlement. Moreover, a district judge, by individual rule,
presumably could require the parties to attend a conference prior to
filing a dismissal stipulation, at which time the balancing of interests
could be addressed.
C. Analogies Positive and Negative
The public policy relating to secret settlements, and the
likelihood of judicial change, may be informed by two disparate
analogies: mandatory arbitration of employment disputes and the
confidentiality of sexual abuse settlements.
Regardless of the language in Gambale, it seems unlikely that the
lower courts will put a brake on secret settlements, not only out of
their interest in caseload control, but also because the Supreme Court
has signaled that it would not endorse such an approach. The Court's
sense of the balance between public access and efficient resolution
was made apparent in its decisions regarding the arbitrability of
discrimination claims. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,227
the Court held that an age discrimination claim is subject to a
mandatory arbitration provision covering employment-related
disputes.228  It flatly rejected the argument that discrimination
litigation not only resolves individual grievances but also furthers
broad social policies.22 9 The Court took the view that the vindication
of the statutory claim in arbitration serves both remedial and
deterrent goals.230 As to the contention that arbitration prevents
public knowledge of discrimination, the Court noted that the
applicable rules required written award decisions to be "made
available to the public." '31 The dissent did not take issue with either
of these assertions and was concerned only that because arbitration
could not address "class-wide injunctive relief," it thereby frustrated
an essential purpose of discrimination statutes.232 In Circuit City
227. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
228. Id. at 27-29.
229. Id. at 27-28.
230. Id. at 28.
231. Id. at 31-32. The arbitration was pursuant to the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange. Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 41-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stores, Inc. v. Adams,233 the Court expanded the Gilmer holding,
interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act to encompass all
employment contracts, except for those involving transportation
workers.3
The arbitration cases have been widely criticized by legal
scholars concerned about anti-discrimination values.235  Legislative
and lobbying efforts underway to overturn the decisions are unlikely
to be successful, however.236 Those knowledgeable about arbitration
argue that the Court vastly overrated the deterrent aspect of awards;
the claim that awards are available to the public can only be described
as disingenuous.237 In the securities industry, for example, awards
may be publicly available, but they are not published or indexed;
access .requires knowledge of the case number and a visit to the
organization that administers the system.238  Nevertheless, the
movement towards employment arbitration has grown dramatically:
one study indicates that the percentage of private employees using
arbitration grew from 3.6% in 1991 to 19% in 1997.239 The arbitration
cases make clear that in the employment discrimination context, the
court will privilege docket control through alternative dispute
resolution over the general deterrent function of public access
through litigation.2" Thus, there is little hope that the lower courts
will be receptive to the claim that private settlements violate the
underlying goals of the anti-discrimination statutes.
On the other hand, there has been a tremendous groundswell
against secret settlements in a different context: the Catholic
Church's sexual abuse scandal. As that scandal grew, dozens of
people who had settled claims under confidentiality agreements came
forward in the media with details of their abuse and the payment they
233. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
234. Id. at 119.
235. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination
Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395,397 (1999).
236. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 781 (2003) (stating that "a concerted lobbying effort has
been mounted in federal and state legislatures for legislation which would curtail
employment arbitration despite the ruling in Circuit City").
237. Id.
238. Moohr, supra note 235, at 432.
239. Hill, supra note 236, at 779.
240. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991). The
Court rejected Gilmer's argument that because arbitrators do not issue written opinions,
the public will lack knowledge of employer's discrimination policies. Id. The Court relied
on the EEOC's authority to mediate ADEA claims to show a statutory intent to further
the "out-of-court dispute resolution." Id. at 29.
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received. 4' It was generally acknowledged that although the secrecy
clauses might be legally enforceable (unless declared void as violative
of public policy), any attempt to silence abuse victims would be a
public relations disaster.242 Some church officials said publicly that
they would take no action against those who spoke out.2 43 The press
also questioned why lawyers and judges acquiesced to secrecy
demands, given the danger to other children posed by predatory
priests.24 Several lawyers expressed regret for their actions.245 One
lawyer claimed that he now tells clients at the outset that he will not
enter into a confidential settlement, under the belief that advance
notice would obviate potential ethical concerns.246
If employment discrimination plaintiffs felt compelled to engage
in similar civil disobedience, or employment lawyers amended their
retainer agreements to have clients prospectively reject
confidentiality clauses, perhaps the harm created by secrecy would
begin to capture public attention. Indeed, it is possible to imagine a
sexual harassment claimant breaching an agreement in order to
protect others from a predatory boss. However, the analogy to sexual
abuse may be of limited utility: unlike in the Catholic Church
situation, employers can legitimately assert that no wrongdoing has
been proved, and it is unlikely that they would feel the same
constraints with regard to enforcing confidentiality agreements.
Secret settlements in discrimination matters work less dramatically
but more insidiously to subvert the public interest.
IV. THE IMPACT OF INVISIBLE SETTLEMENTS
Because of invisible settlements, no one knows-or has the
capacity to determine-what really is going on with employment
discrimination litigation. Are there too many frivolous or, at the very
least, weak claims filed? Are most cases settled for nuisance value, as
many employers contend? Or are many employees recovering six or
seven figure settlements? Of course, all secret settlements can be
241. See Adam Liptak, Price of Broken Vows of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, § 1,
at 20; Daron Madhari, Breaking a Vow of Silence on Abuse, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2002, at
Al.
242. Liptak, supra note 241.
243. Richard Nangle, Secrecy Agreements Criticized, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE
(Worcester, Mass.), May 10, 2002, at At, available at http://www.telegram.com/static/
crisisinthechurch/051002a.html.
244. Liptak, supra note 241.
245. Eileen McNamara, Court Must End Secrecy, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2002, at
B1.
246. Id.
2006]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
criticized in general terms as violative of democratic values,
transparent process, and open government.247 But this Part focuses
more specifically on their impact with regard to civil rights
enforcement.
A. The Problem of Empiricism
The information vacuum created by invisible settlements has
resulted in possibly erroneous, and certainly skewed, conclusions
being drawn from the very limited available data about discrimination
claims. Recent empirical studies attempt to draw conclusions about
employment discrimination litigation outcomes by analyzing the
results in cases decided by summary judgment or after trial.24 These
studies claim that plaintiffs prevail at a substantially lower rate than
other federal court claimants. Several authors have undertaken these
projects explicitly to respond to conservative critics, who see
employment discrimination legislation as primarily creating a new
kind of lottery for protected classes, adding to the "litigation
explosion," and disadvantaging American business by necessitating
the expenditure of resources on account of frivolous employment
claims.249 They argue that bias on the part of factfinders causes the
difference in success rates.
Despite the good intentions standing behind this empirical work,
discussed in detail below, these studies are likely to provide fodder
for those who believe that real employment discrimination has been
eradicated. The "Occam's razor" principle seems applicable: the
simple and obvious explanation is most likely the correct oneY0
Thus, the critics to whom these studies are addressed will conclude
that the authors merely demonstrate that most employment
discrimination plaintiffs have weak cases and lose at trial because
they cannot show that they have suffered discrimination; employers
are quick to settle any case where the plaintiff has a likelihood of
success. Rather than persuading judges and policymakers of bias in
247. See Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 627, 630-31 (2004) (stating that settlements, generally, are not consistent
with ideals of the democratic process).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 251-90.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 251-90.
250. This principle, attributed to and named after medieval philosopher William of
Occam states: "[E]ntities should not be multiplied needlessly. This rule is interpreted to
mean that the simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable and that an
explanation for unknown phenomena should first be attempted in terms of what is already
known." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1216
(Joseph P. Pickett ed., 4th ed. 2000).
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factfinding, these studies reinforce the existing perceptions about the
prevalence of meritless claims. Indeed, this viewpoint might be more
effectively countered by demonstrating that success in employment
claims matches that in tort claims, a conclusion that finds support in
some of the data discussed below. Moreover, the impact of these
studies is vastly exaggerated because data suggesting the contrary
conclusion-that employment claimants receive reasonable
compensation through settlement-is unavailable. Successful claims
are made invisible by secret settlements. Demonstrating that most
plaintiffs lose will not deter but rather will encourage critics of civil
rights litigation.
Michael Selmi sets out to disprove empirically what he views as a
common misperception-fueled by conservative interest groups-
that employment discrimination cases are easy to win.251  This
perception, he argues, affects judges as well as the general public, and
has led the courts to view these employment claims, particularly in
the race area, as often "unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs
who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the way. 252
Using data from the federal Administrative Office of the Courts for
the years 1995-97, Selmi compares plaintiff success rates in three
categories: jobs, insurance, and personal injury. For jury trials,
plaintiffs' win rate is 39.9% in the jobs category, 51.3% in insurance,
and 40.8% in personal injury; for non-jury trials, the percentages are
18.7%, 43.6%, and 41.8%, respectively.25 3
Selmi suggests that the disparity between the jury and non-jury
plaintiff verdicts in the jobs category supports his claim of judicial
bias.254 He rejects the possibility that the statistics merely show that
there are fewer meritorious discrimination cases.255 He argues that,
since attorneys who litigate these cases are motivated by their profit
potential, they will not accept weak cases. 6 But attorneys often do
not have access to complete information at the time of filing.257 If
discovery disproves the plaintiff's account, Selmi suggests that there
251. Selmi, supra note 12, at 557 (citing, in support of the proposition that employment
discrimination claims are easy to win, RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992);
PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994); and WALTER K. OLSON,
THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (1997)).
252. Id. at 556.
253. Id. at 560.
254. Id. at 561.
255. Id. at 569.
256. Id. at 569-70.
257. Id. at 570.
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would be more voluntary dismissals in discrimination matters than in
other types of cases, however, which is not borne out by the data.28
But he does conclude that there are a number of employment
discrimination cases that should never have been filed, and he urges
attorneys to engage in careful case selection. 9 He also encourages
plaintiffs to present expert testimony on the nature of unconscious or
subtle discrimination, in an effort to "countermand judicial bias. '26 °
A closer look at Selmi's statistics reveals data that might call into
question some of his conclusions. Interestingly, the percentage of
plaintiff jury verdicts in the categories of jobs and personal injury is
virtually identical: 39.9% and 40.8% .261 Although the insurance case
percentage is higher,262 these claims are largely contractual and not
comparable. But most importantly, Selmi fails to consider the
significance of a much larger percentage of case dispositions that fall
into the category of "other dismissals": 67% in jobs and 64% in
personal injury.263 It is fair to assume that the vast majority of these
cases are stipulated dismissals behind which stand confidential
settlement agreements. These invisible settlements at least should be
noted in the evaluation of plaintiff outcomes.
Like Selmi, David Oppenheimer sets out to inform the public
policy debates that rely heavily on negative outcomes264 by studying
verdict reports in California employment law cases. Finding evidence
of substantial disadvantage to women and minorities, he also
attributes disparities to judge and juror bias.2165 He suggests the
problem of bias is further exacerbated by the "false claims and heated
rhetoric ' 266 about employment litigation, including claims that
litigants get "enormous unwarranted benefits. '267
Oppenheimer's data show that in California in the two-year
period 1997-98, plaintiffs won statutory discrimination claims 50% of
the time, with a median verdict of $200,000.268 But for certain
claimants the success rate was much lower: age discrimination
plaintiffs, 27%; non-white race discrimination plaintiffs, 36%; female
258. Id.
259. Id. at 571.
260. Id. at 573.
261. Id. at 560.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 559.
264. Oppenheimer, supra note 12, at 514.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 515.
267. Id. at 518.
268. Id. at 535.
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sex discrimination non-harassment plaintiffs, 35%.269 The 50% win
rate encompasses actions in which whites sued for discrimination,
which had a 100% success rate and sexual harassment actions, which
represented one-third of the total and had a win rate of 68% for
women alleging harassment by men, and 100% for men alleging
harassment by other men.27 °
Oppenheimer raises some questions about the reliability of the
data, however, and suggests that it reflects higher success rates and
verdicts than a study of court records would show. 271 He notes that
verdict services rely on lawyers to report trial results, and winning
lawyers with substantial verdicts obviously are the ones most likely to
submit information.2 But he does not acknowledge the tremendous
impact on his data of confidentiality clauses, which bar almost all
reporting of settlements.
Oppenheimer rejects several possible explanations for his
findings. Because of the difference in success rates between sexual
harassment claims and discriminatory discharge cases, it is difficult to
attribute lower win rates in the latter type of cases to employers'
advantages as repeat players, or because they have more to lose or
have more resources. 273  He concludes that judicial or juror bias
against certain classes of litigants-particularly older women and
black women-accounts for the differences, citing public opinion
surveys indicating that white respondents do not believe that blacks
still suffer from job discrimination and any inequality is the result of
blacks' "lack of motivation. ' 274 Public opinion is further influenced
by the recent assault on anti-discrimination laws in a number of
popular books, which make claims that employers are being forced to
use quotas and settle meritless claims at the risk of ruinous verdicts
based on the few highly publicized instances of large verdicts.275
Clermont and Schwab's 2004 study, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court,76 provides a more
detailed, longitudinal, and up-to-date analysis of the same data that
Selmi considered, but in essence reaches the same conclusion:
plaintiffs "have a tough row to hoe. ' 277 Although, unlike Selmi and
269. Id. at 517.
270. Id. at 535-40.
271. Id. at 554.
272. Id. at 550.
273. Id. at 553.
274. Id. at 561.
275. Id. at 562-63.
276. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 429.
277. Id.
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Oppenheimer, Clermont and Schwab posit no explanatory theories,
they do suggest a trend towards more equivalent outcomes." 8
With little discussion, the authors make note of data
demonstrating that the success of employment claims may be
approaching the personal injury norm. Looking at statistics from
1979 to 2001, they found that in the "jobs" category, the percentage of
cases tried has dropped from 18.2% to 3.7%.279 The percentage of
bench trials also dropped substantially: in 2000, 87% of trials went to
a jury, as compared to 10% in 1979.280 Simply by combining certain
disposition codes used by the Administrative Office of the Courts
coding system, they conclude that almost 70% of employment
discrimination cases are resolved by settlement.2 81 These include the
category for settlement, but also the "voluntary dismissals," and by
far the largest category, "other dismissals. ' 28 2  The gap between
plaintiff win rates in employment discrimination as compared to other
cases has narrowed substantially: in 1979, 16.5% compared to 40%;
in 2001, 39.5% compared to 44.3%.283 Looking just at jury trials, win
rates are almost even, and win rates before judges show a marked
upward trajectory. 84 One difference in employment discrimination
cases is the frequency of pre-trial adjudication, most commonly
summary judgment. Clermont and Schwab's appendix shows that
between 1979 and 2001 non-trial adjudication accounts for similar
percentages in jobs and non-jobs cases, 19.24% compared to 19.13%,
but pre-trial adjudication plaintiff win rates show a large discrepancy,
4.23% in jobs, 22.23% in non-jobs.285 However, since plaintiffs are
rarely in a position to move affirmatively for judgment, the relevant
statistic would be the percentage of motions granting summary
judgment to the employer.
Berger, Finkelstein, and Cheung look specifically at the issue of
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, in an effort
to provide some hard data that would be useful to litigants and
mediators in settlement negotiations.286 As they note, when cases are
278. Id. at 441.
279. Id. at 438-39.
280. Id. at 438.
281. Id. at 440.
282. Id. at 440 n.14.
283. Id. at 441.
284. Id. at 441-42, app. at 457.
285. Id. at 444.
286. Vivian Berger, Michael 0. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 48-49, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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referred for mediation, negotiations often revolve around the
likelihood of the case being dismissed on summary judgment: the
plaintiff may lose entirely, but if the claim survives, trial-with the
attendant costs and uncertainty287-becomes inevitable. Analyzing
summary judgment dispositions in two federal district courts in New
York City using dockets sheets available through the courts' online
Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") database,
they found that defendants made summary judgment motions in
22.8% of employment cases, with motions denied in 36.4% of those.288
Thus, 14.5% of all filed cases were dismissed on summary judgment,
and 8.3% were to go forward to trial, absent settlement. But when
pro se cases (which represent 18.87% of employment filings overall
and 33.3% of employment filings in the PACER data) are eliminated,
denials go up 46.4%.289 Thus, it is fair to say that plaintiffs win close
to half of the summary judgment motions.
This study makes a small inroad into the secrecy surrounding
settlement and the misperceptions of success rates for plaintiffs.
Extrapolating from this data, it appears that summary judgment
denials occur in 8.3% of all employment cases and in 10.5% of non-
pro se employment cases. In effect, the denial of summary judgment
results in what should be considered a plaintiff win. Noting that a
denial often results in a settlement and raises the settlement value of
the case,29 the authors understate the significance of such a decision.
Cases that survive a summary judgment motion are worth
substantially more than the proverbial "nuisance value."
B. The Problem of Representation
All of these studies are related to and, in a sense, represent a
subset of, the burgeoning literature on the "vanishing trial"
phenomenon in the federal courts, currently a subject of much debate
by procedure scholars.291 Marc Galanter's extensive study revealed
that the overall trial rate has dropped from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in
2002.2 2 Civil rights cases in 2002 were tried at a higher rate, 3.8%,
representing over a third of all trials, and have replaced torts as being
287. Id.
288. Id. (manuscript at 53, 55).
289. Id. (manuscript at 55 nn.48, 56).
290. Id. (manuscript at 48-49).
291. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 2, at 459 (discussing "the decline in the portion of
cases that are terminated by trial and the decline in the absolute number of trials in
various American judicial fora").
292. Id.
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the most likely to reach trial.293 It is assumed, but not fully
investigated, that as trials have decreased, settlements have increased.
Indeed, many of the hypotheses advanced by Galanter for the
decrease-diversion of cases to ADR, litigation expense, and
managerial judging, with its heightened emphasis on mediation29 -
would naturally result in more settlements.
Procedure scholars are now considering the consequences of the
demise of trials, which mirror the ramifications of, and are
exacerbated by, invisible settlements. Galanter notes that in the
absence of trials, settlements, which once entailed "bargaining in the
shadow of the law," cannot be guided by authoritative determinations
of fact.295 Lawyers cannot "make reliable estimates of expected trial
outcomes. ' 296 He suggests that all litigation will come to resemble
Janet Alexander's description of securities class action litigation
cases:
[B]ecause securities class actions rarely if ever go to trial,
settlement judges, like lawyers, have little relevant experience
to draw on other than their knowledge of settlements in similar
cases. In these circumstances, their role becomes not to
increase the accuracy of settlements, but to provide an impetus
to reach some settlement. In the absence of information about
how similar cases fared at trial, settlement judges could be an
important force in maintaining a "going rate" approach to
settlements.297
The problems resulting from secret settlements in employment
discrimination claims are even more pronounced than in the
securities area. In class actions, although there may be few trials,
settlements become public by virtue of the rule requiring their judicial
approval.298 In fact, Alexander was able to determine that in almost
all securities class actions, the final settlement represented twenty-five
percent of the amount at stake.299 No such benchmarks are available
when settlement amounts are kept confidential.
293. Id. at 468.
294. Id. at 515-20.
295. Id. at 525.
296. Id. at 526.
297. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 566 (1991).
298. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) ("The court must approve any settlement ... of a
certified class.").
299. Alexander, supra note 297, at 517,545.
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Thus, invisible settlements in discrimination claims infect the
process of representing discrimination claimants, particularly with
regard to case selection, counseling, and negotiation. Take, for
example, the situation in which a woman consults an attorney
claiming that she was the target of sexual harassment and failed to
receive a promotion at her job with a major corporation. The
calculation of back pay may be relatively straightforward, but how is
the lawyer to evaluate possible compensatory and punitive damages?
Trial verdicts and settlement reports are the traditional sources for
such information; in the tort area, for example, extensive verdict and
settlement reporting services perform this function. In fact, in tort
law, the volume of data available has led to the development of a
"common law" of settlement. Formulas for calculating damages-
such as medical expenses multiplied by two-are commonplace. 3°°
Confidentiality clauses have made the broad compilation of such
data impossible in employment cases. Highly specialized lawyers may
rely on their own experiences with settlement, 30 1 but most
employment lawyers do not litigate a sufficient volume of cases to
make such evaluations very reliable. Informal and formal lawyer
networks provide another common source of information for case
evaluation, but again confidentiality concerns inhibit the discussion of
cases in all but the most general terms.30 2
What if the client suggests-as many do-that other claims may
have been made against her employer, and the diligent attorney
undertakes her own research? If the existence of another action is
discovered, with federal "notice" pleading, the complaint may contain
only the barest of factual allegations. Since Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5 was amended in 2000 to mirror the local rules of many
districts, discovery materials are no longer filed with the court.303
Assuming the matter is settled confidentially prior to a summary
judgment motion, the case file will contain a stipulation of dismissal
and nothing else of a substantive nature. The existence of a prior
lawsuit suggests the possibility of a problem in the workplace. But
without any information about the substance of the settlement, it has
little predictive value. The settlement agreement in the earlier case
300. Id. at 541.
301. See generally Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases:
Development and Uses, 43 No. 1 JUDGES' J. 19 (2004) (discussing how the collection of
settlement data can educate judges and parties as to appropriate settlement outcomes).
302. Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 698 (2001).
303. See FED. R. CiV. P. 5(d).
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bars the plaintiff and her attorney from discussing the allegations or
the outcome.
Secrecy affects the subsequent litigation in a number of ways.
First, for the lawyer working on a contingency basis, knowledge of the
underlying facts and the settlement amount would greatly affect the
likelihood of undertaking representation. Second, an attorney might
counsel the client differently about potential outcomes, depending on
whether the settlement was for $2,000 or $200,000. Finally,
knowledge of the prior settlement amount would have a substantial
impact on settlement negotiations. Taking the most concrete
example, plaintiff's counsel cannot effectively respond to defense
counsel's assertion that the prior litigation was settled for nuisance
value. The corporate defense lawyer has a substantial "repeat
player" advantage. Even the specialized plaintiff's lawyer cannot
reveal details of prior litigation. Simply asserting that a former client
received a $100,000 settlement in a similar action does not go far in
the negotiation process.
Invisible settlements, along with the decline of trials, also hamper
a judge's ability to assist with the settlement process. As discussed
above, some seventy percent of employment cases will simply
disappear from the docket, most commonly through stipulations of
dismissal, with no formal judicial action.3" It may be that some
judges are active in precipitating settlements that result in these
dismissals, but the final terms still are not disclosed or made part of
the court record. Increasingly, however, judges delegate this function
to magistrate judges, or court-annexed mediators, thus further
limiting their settlement "database. '30 5
Invisible settlements, vanishing trials, ADR-all of these
developments keep civil rights claims out of the public eye. The
concept of public law no longer holds sway. Trials tell stories and
provide official and public vindication. Settlements can tell stories,
too, but not when they are immune from public scrutiny. The
proliferation of invisible settlements has left us with a highly
circumscribed view of discrimination in the workplace. Certainly, not
every settlement is proof that an employer has engaged in biased
decisionmaking. But considered in the aggregate, acquiescence to
304. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 281.
305. Baker, supra note 108, at 661 (discussing the increasing responsibilities of the
Article I judiciary and its profound impact on the federal courts); cf. Denlow & Shack,
supra note 301, at 19 (detailing an effort in Illinois to compile a database of settlement
data for use in increasingly prevalent settlement conferences).
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demands of confidentiality endangers the future enforcement of our
discrimination laws.
V. REMEDYING INVISIBILITY
A number of means exist to address the problem of invisible
settlements, all of which-until recently-seemed to have little
chance of seeing the light of day. Now, however, the stir over
vanishing trials suggests a slight swinging back of the pendulum
between public and private dispute resolution. This Part discusses
several approaches that specifically address the problem of secrecy in
the context of discrimination claims: legislative or regulatory
changes; resistance, organizational efforts and publicity directed
against secrecy by the plaintiffs' employment law bar; and the
collection of aggregate, anonymous settlement data. Of these
options, this Part contends that regulatory action by the EEOC holds
the most promise for providing real transparency and for ease and
efficiency of administration.
The most obvious way to enhance the public function of
discrimination laws and return to the "private attorney general"
concept of enforcement would be to require judicial approval of
settlement agreements, which would then become part of the public
record, unless perhaps good cause could be demonstrated for sealing
the record. The rationale is not unlike, although less compelling than,
that which necessitates approval of class action settlements: there are
unnamed parties who will be affected by the result. In the case of
employment discrimination, although a settlement does not curtail
the rights of other employees, it does have an impact on the future
assertion of claims.
Even without statutory amendments, there is precedent for the
adoption of such a judicial interpretation. The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 ("FLSA")3 °6 gives workers a cause of action against
employers who fail to pay overtime wages and permits the recovery
of back pay and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.3 7
Shortly after the FLSA's passage, the Supreme Court held that an
employee cannot bargain away through settlement his right to wages
or damages.3 °8 Although the statute did not directly address this
issue, the Court reasoned that settlements endangered the public
306. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
307. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 115-16 (1946); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (setting forth the damages that an employee may claim).
308. D.A. Schulte, 328 U.S. at 116.
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purpose of the law, and given the unequal bargaining power of
employees, more than a private agreement is necessary.3" The Court
indicated that compromise could be effectuated through the entry of
stipulated judgments, however, noting that "we think the requirement
of pleading the issues and submitting the judgment to judicial scrutiny
may differentiate stipulated judgments from compromises by the
parties. ,310
In a dissent that echoes much of current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority,
commenting that the policy underlying a statute "should be drawn out
of its terms . . ., and not, like nitrogen, out of the air."31' It is hard to
imagine that this reasoning would not prevail today against the
argument that the purposes of Title VII require judicial approval of
settlements. And in this era of docket control, it is unlikely that
Congress would amend the statute or the courts would adopt a
statutory interpretation that would expand the judiciary's workload.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FLSA still
stands, and even the articulation of the argument might call attention
to the ubiquity and dangers of invisible settlements.
On the other hand, the EEOC, which is charged with
interpreting the employment discrimination statutes, as well as
bringing significant litigation, could-and should-take up the cause
of public accessibility through the issuance of regulations that would
limit confidential settlements by requiring judicial approval of
negotiated agreements. Indeed, with regard to the settlement of
actions that it commences, the agency prohibits confidentiality
agreements and requires that "resolutions ... must contain all
settlement terms and be filed in the public court record.""31  The
agency considers its policy as mandated both by the right of the public
to "have access to the results of the agency's litigation activities," and
because "one of the principal purposes of enforcement actions ... is
to deter violations by the party being sued and by other entities
subject to the laws. Other entities cannot be deterred by the relief
obtained in a particular case unless they learn what that relief was." '313
For those who argue that cases would not settle without
309. Id.
310. Id. at 114 n.8.
311. Id. at 121-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
312. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, REGIONAL ATTORNEYS' MANUAL pt. 3, at 58 (2005), available at http://www.
eeoc.gov/ litigation/manual/pdf/part3.pdf.
313. Id.
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confidentiality, the EEOC policy counsels otherwise. In addition,
such a regulation would have a salutary side effect: employers who
strongly valued confidentiality would have an added impetus to
resolve claims through mediation at the agency level, where
confidentiality is the rule.314
Given the EEOC's articulation of statutory purposes, it would
seem appropriate for the agency to issue a regulation that would call
on courts to approve discrimination settlements and make them part
of the court record, absent special circumstances. Just recently-in
July 2005-the Fourth Circuit approved this approach as to claims
brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), relying
on Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations that require court or
agency approval of settlements.315 In Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.,
the plaintiff brought an action alleging that she was deprived of her
right to medical leave and terminated in retaliation for complaining
about her employer's violation of the FMLA.316 At the time of her
termination, she was offered and accepted additional compensation in
exchange for a release of any claims under the discrimination statutes
and "any other federal, state or local law. 3 17 Relying on the release,
the employer moved for summary judgment. In response, Taylor
claimed that the release was unenforceable because of a DOL
regulation providing that "employees cannot waive, nor may
employers induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA,"
without DOL or judicial approval, as is the case under FLSA.318 The
court rejected the only other judicial interpretation of the regulation,
the Fifth Circuit's holding that it barred only prospective waivers of
substantive FMLA rights.319  Rather, the court found that the
regulation on its face barred all waivers, including retrospective
claims of discrimination and retaliation, and that although the statute
was silent on this issue, DOL acted within the bounds of Congress's
delegation of rulemaking authority.320 Moreover, in enacting the 1995
regulation, DOL had explicitly rejected employers' arguments that
the agency should adopt Title VII's allowance of waivers, and instead
chose to model enforcement on the FLSA.321 In addition, using the
Chevron test, the court held that the regulation was based upon a
314. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.22, 1601.26 (2005).
315. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 365 (4th Cir. 2005).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 367.
318. Id. at 368 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d)).
319. Id. at 371-72.
320. Id. at 372.
321. Id.
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permissible construction of the statute.3"' Significantly, it rejected the
employer's argument that the regulation worked against the general
public policy favoring settlement, finding that the agency need not
have privileged that concern over the protection of employee rights.3"
While there are differences between the DOL-administered
statutes and the discrimination statutes under the EEOC's purview,
there are important parallels. Like Title VII, neither the FLSA nor
the FMLA make any reference to judicial approval. The requirement
was first created by the Supreme Court as a purely public policy
gloss 324 and taken up by the enforcing agency. Certainly, the public
policy underlying the discrimination statutes is at least as compelling.
Because the EEOC is not authorized under Title VII to issue rules
interpreting substantive statutory provisions, its substantive
regulations are not accorded Chevron deference and are more closely
examined for consistency with congressional intent.312 But Congress
did authorize the agency to issue "suitable procedural regulations to
carry out the provisions of" the employment discrimination
statutes.326 Although the issue has not been definitively addressed,
several justices have expressed the view that such procedural rules are
entitled to full deference. 327 Thus, a strong argument can be made
that an anti-secrecy regulation enacted by the EEOC should be given
the same deference as the Taylor court showed to the DOL
regulation. Some employment law experts have suggested, however,
that given the conflicting circuit court opinions, Taylor may find its
way to the Supreme Court,328 where congressional silence might
receive different treatment.
Other existing approaches to limiting secret settlements-local
federal court rules, state statutes, and ethics rules-are largely
designed to address public health and safety concerns, and often do
322. Id. at 375.
323. Id. at 373.
324. See D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946) (inferring that neither
wages nor damages can be reduced through compromise because that would violate
congressional intent).
325. EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2000).
327. See, e.g., Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that the EEOC's regulation is entitled to Chevron deference).
328. See, e.g., Francis W. Connolly & Larry R. Seegull, Fourth Circuit: No Waiver or
Release of FMLA Claims Without DOL or Court Approval, DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY
CARY, Jul. 26, 2005, http://www.dlapiper.com/us/experience/publicationdetail.aspx?id
=4195 ("[T]he enforceability of waivers of prospective substantive FMLA claims may be
primed for resolution by the Supreme Court.").
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not provide a remedy for invisible settlements of civil rights claims.
For example, the federal district court in South Carolina recently
adopted a local rule prohibiting sealed settlement agreements in most
circumstances, but it explicitly permits "parties, by agreement, to
restrict access to documents which are not filed with the Court.
3 29
Several states have enacted "sunshine in litigation" legislation, which
declare as void and contrary to public policy contracts that have "the
purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard," to use the language
of Florida's law.330 A proposed ethics rule would bar lawyers from
agreeing to prevent public access to information that concerns
"substantial danger to the public health or safety." '331 In a recent
article, Richard Zitrin details the specifics of these efforts, arguing
that they do not go far enough.332 But his concern is with open access
to documents relating to "a known harm-whether it is a defective
product, toxic waste, or a molesting soccer coach," '3 33 and he makes no
reference to the civil rights context. Zitrin suggests that scholarly and
media attention to litigation secrecy is creating something of a
groundswell for legislative action.334 Advocates for openness have all
but ignored secrecy in the discrimination context, however. More
broadly worded statutes, barring enforcement of secret settlements
found to be against the public interest, would allow for the inclusion
of civil rights claims.
Surprisingly, Zitrin is willing to forego disclosure of settlement
amounts, even when the statutes do not, because he views monetary
relief as affecting a "non-substantive issue." '335 A recently defeated
sunshine bill in California specifically exempted disclosure of
monetary relief.336  In employment discrimination settlements,
however, there is little of true public interest other than the identity
of the parties, the fact of the settlement, and the settlement amount.
Particularly because every agreement contains a disclaimer of legal
liability, the amount paid to the plaintiff is an important indicator of
possible culpability. Moreover, as discussed above, knowledge of
329. Zitrin, supra note 133, at 884.
330. Id. at 891 (citations omitted); see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
331. Zitrin, supra note 133, at 905.
332. Id. at 895.
333. Id. at 887.
334. Id. at 890.
335. Id. at 887 n.17.
336. Assem. Bill 1700, 2005-06 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); E-mail from Richard
Zitrin, Adjunct Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings, to the law clinicians' discussion list at
Washburn School of Law (Mar. 1, 2005, 04:03 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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settlement amounts is critical in case evaluation, client counseling,
and negotiation.
Still another approach would be for the plaintiffs' employment
law bar to "just say no" and organize a campaign against secrecy.
Civil rights lawyers have said no before, refusing to negotiate in the
face of fee waiver demands, for example, and including authority to
do so in their retainer agreements.337 Similarly, if plaintiffs' lawyers
obtained their clients' prospective agreement to refuse settlements
containing confidentiality clauses, the balance of power in
negotiations could shift.338 Just as defense counsel now claim that
they will never settle without confidentiality, the plaintiffs' bar could
become equally assertive. It is likely that cases would continue to
settle at the same rate, as was the case when Florida adopted a
sunshine statute.339
For this approach to work, however, public attention must be
focused on the unfairness and harm caused by secrecy. ATLA, which
represents a substantial segment of the plaintiffs' personal injury bar,
has actively pursued such an agenda with regard to tort claims." It
has officially condemned secret settlements and lobbies for legislation
restricting them.341 Its website is a rich source of information and data
supporting the anti-secrecy position.342  The National Employment
337. Davies, supra note 33, at 216 (stating that attorneys flatly refused to waive fees but
would cut fees below amount in retainer agreements when settlement offers were made);
E. Richard Larson, Recent Developments in the Law of Attorney's Fees, C742 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. CONTINUING EDUC. 781, 844 (1992) (suggesting that no-waiver clauses are the
most common strategy for dealing with fee-related conflicts).
338. There is some question, however, whether a retainer agreement that restricts a
client from accepting a confidential settlement would be viewed as ethically proper. Bar
associations have split on the propriety of retainers that prohibit a client from accepting a
settlement that contains a waiver of attorney's fees, with a few states finding that they
improperly interfere with a client's right to control settlement decisions. See Daniel
Nazar, Note, Conflict and Solidarity: The Legacy of Evans v. Jeff D., 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHiCS 499,518-20 (2004).
339. See Zitrin, supra note 133, at 891-92.
340. See ATLA Press Room: Secrecy in the Courts News: Background, http://www.
atlanet.org/pressroom/FACTS/secrecy/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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342. The website of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America contains a number of
reports on secrecy in the courts. See ATLA Press Room, Secrecy Provisions 2005 (2005),
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INVISIBLE SETTLEMENTS
Law Association ("NELA") is a fast-growing organization of
plaintiffs' counsel, but apparently it has not publicly addressed the
issues of confidentiality and invisible settlements. NELA should
mount a lobbying effort to encourage passage of sunshine legislation
that encompasses civil rights claims as it has done to oppose
mandatory arbitration.
Yet even if these suggestions are not accepted, the importance of
data collection-for practicing lawyers, the judiciary, and
policymakers-cannot be underestimated. Empiricists caution
against replacing no data with bad data.3 43 Relying on trial outcomes
to draw conclusions about the state of employment discrimination law
does just that. In this regard, I suggest an experiment that would
allow for information-gathering without jeopardizing the policies that
support contractual confidentiality. The Administrative Office of the
Courts is developing a new data-collection system that will take
advantage of the federal courts' adoption of electronic case and
docket management.3" It should take this opportunity to find out
more about settlements. Presumably, it would be possible to require
parties to provide additional information when a case is terminated
by a stipulation of dismissal-at least whether it is the result of a
settlement contract. If so, while the parties' names could remain
confidential, the amount of the settlement and the general
characteristics of the matter could be recorded and entered into a
database.3 45  Thus, for example, it would be possible to determine
with accuracy the percentage of sexual harassment cases settled in
on civil cases in federal courts); see also Laurie Kratky Dore, The Confidentiality Debate
and the Push to Regulate Secrecy in Civil Litigation (2000), http://www.roscoepound
.org/new/00kratky.pdf (unpublished manuscript for the Roscoe Pound Institute, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (advocating a "functional" approach that sets up
hurdles for confidentiality proponents in any given case).
343. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trial and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah, 1 J. EMP. L. STUD. 591, 605 (2004). See
generally Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1455 (2003) (analyzing how errors in data entry affect how the data can be used);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications,
and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004) (highlighting the importance of auditing federal courts' data to
assess the rates of trial settlements versus public nontrial adjudications).
344. Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data
and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 581 (2004).
345. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has created such a database
to assist judges in holding settlement conferences. See Denlow & Shack, supra note 301, at
19.
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any particular judicial district and the mean, median, and average
recoveries. In addition, data relating to procedural history, including
summary judgment, utilization of ADR resources, and the gender and
race of the plaintiff would allow a more nuanced understanding of
our civil rights laws, both substantively and procedurally.
CONCLUSION
The trends that have contributed to the increasing prevalence of
invisible settlements are not likely to be reversed. In fact, the tort-
based contingency fee model of employment discrimination litigation
appears to be more firmly entrenched than ever, given the Supreme
Court's recently announced view-challenging a long line of cases-
that settlements never merit a judicial award of attorney's fees.346 As
a result, there is little in the way of a database to inform public
discourse. Unsupported rhetoric plagues the debate over the
prevalence of discrimination in the workplace and the utility of our
civil rights laws, with the left claiming that bias pervades the
factfinding process and the right arguing that employers are being
held hostage by nuisance claims. Because recent empirical studies
rely on a tiny and probably unrepresentative fraction of claims
brought, they do not add much in the way of real information.
The collection of aggregate data would be of some use, but given
the factual intricacies of each matter, identifying comparables to aid
in negotiation is difficult. A better solution is for the EEOC to adopt
a rule equivalent to what the agency itself enforces with regard to its
own litigation: as a matter of policy, settlements must be a matter of
public record. If employers are so fearful of this result, they will
settle at the administrative stage, where confidentiality can remain
the rule, thus reducing federal court filing and the need for court-
annexed ADR. In fact, open settlements should garner support from
both sides of the political debate, since the availability of the data will
allow for reasoned discourse about the status of discrimination in the
workplace.
346. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (holding that attorney's fees will not be awarded based on the
"catalyst theory"-when the plaintiff claims that its lawsuit was the catalyst for the
defendant's voluntary change in policy or practice-and suggesting that private
settlements, unlike consent decrees, do not merit fee-shifting).
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